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Between 1970 and 2000, new institutions were established at the 
Norwegian operational level of war. However, in the beginning of the 
21st century the Norwegian government started slimming down the 
Armed Forces and the operational level declined. The main question 
of the book is how this development can be explained. Using theory 
drawn from the social sciences, the author explores the power of five 
structural explanatory factors: the strategic importance of the northern 
flank; Norway’s position and role in NATO; the changing character of 
war; financial resources; and changes in technology. All factors have 
had an impact on this development, but changes in the civil-military 
relations have also affected the significance of the operational level in 
contemporary war planning.
Keywords: Norwegian Armed Forces, operational level, war planning, NATO, 
civil-military relations, institutions
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Following the end of the Cold War, NATO itself and several important 
NATO members set about streamlining their command structures. By 
then, work had been ongoing in Norway to build institutional capacity 
since the early 1970s - long before the concept of operational warfare 
was adopted by NATO. This work continued well into the beginning 
of the 21st century apparently unaffected by radically changed strategic 
environment, external conditions and threats from the early 1990s. 
Momentum has subsided in the past nine years or so, as Norwegian 
headquarters suffered setbacks such as institutional marginalisation 
and the fragmentation of expertise in the management of joint mili-
tary operations. The historical trajectory of Norway’s operational level 
of warfare has been unusual, and the 1990s are rightly characterised as 
the “lost decade”.1
How can this rise and decline be explained? Did institutional or 
conceptual requirements create a basis for the establishment of the 
operational level of war in Norway? And why did more than a decade 
elapse after the end of the Cold War before the institutions were cut 
back? This study describes and explains the development of the insti-
tutions at the operational level of war in Norway from 1970 to today. 
The development of these institutions is a complex process, and 
it is necessary to investigate several possible explanatory factors. 
Based on an analysis of the empirical material, this study will explain 
1 Kjell Inge Bjerga and Knut A. Surlien, Forsvarets øverste ledelse i et internasjonalt perspek-
tiv [The central command of the Norwegian Defence from an international perspec-
tive], p. 11. (Oslo, Institutt for forsvarsstudier, 2002). Svein Ivar Hansen, Lieutenant-
General, interview by author, 18 April 2007.
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the development on the basis of five structural explanatory factors:2 
the strategic importance of the northern flank; Norway in NATO; 
the changing character of war; financial resources; and new technol-
ogy. However, before turning to the explanations, we must chart the 
historical developments. Thus, chronological developments before the 
turn of the century will be described first, followed by an explanation 
of developments based on structural factors. Secondly, events after the 
turn of the century will be described and explained. Additionally, I will 
view developments both before and after 2000 in the light of some 
theoretical perspectives on military professionalism and civil-military 
relations. The purpose of this is to place these developments within a 
wider social, political and economic context, something that has not 
been done in Norway. This study will argue that the institutions at 
the operational level of war have evolved in the often tense field be-
tween what is functionally useful and what is socially acceptable – or 
between the functional and social imperatives described by Samuel P. 
Huntington in his classic study The Soldier and the State, published in 
1956.3
A key feature of this study is to consider the relationship between 
the explanatory factors. What were the most important driving forces 
behind the development of these joint operations institutions? Is it 
the case that they evolved primarily as a result of conceptual or other 
professional considerations, in other words as a consequence of “the 
changing character of war”? Or were external conditions such as the 
strategic importance of the northern flank, alliance politics, and eco-
nomic and technological factors more important? I wish to state at 
the outset that the evidence strongly suggests that the external condi-
tions have been far more influential than conceptual or professional 
considerations.
Another important question is the function of the operational 
level. What is its position in the command structure and should this 
structure be simplified by eliminating superfluous levels? The opera-
tional level has traditionally been regarded as being of critical impor-
tance to the employment of military force. Many military professionals 
2 My assessments are based on a study of downgraded and declassified literature and 
documents and on interviews with flag officers who have been commanders-in-chief of 
Defence Commands South Norway, Joint HQ North and Joint operational headquar-
ters in the period 1996–2005. In addition I have interviewed the Chief of Defence in 
the period 1999–2005 and the Chief of the Defence Staff, later the Chief of Staff of the 
armed forces, in the period 2002–2005.
3 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State. The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military 
Relations (Harvard: The Belknapp Press of Harvard University Press, 1956). 
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consider this level as the very hub of the military command structure. 
The Norwegian joint operations doctrine describes this level of com-
mand as the link between strategic and tactical levels, a level which 
adapts political and strategic ends to feasible plans and operations.4 
The military commanders and the institutions at this level are sup-
posed to convert tactical achievements into strategic results. Many 
would argue that the operational level has become less important than 
before in the light of today’s complex conflicts, often characterised by 
new technology and rapidly evolving, politically sensitive situations, 
and that the levels of war should be conflated into a new and simpler 
structure for the conduct of operations.5 On the other hand, the opera-
tional level still possesses the competence and capability to implement 
complicated and complex joint military operations, both at national 
and NATO level. Even though NATO is currently reorganising its 
military command structure and downsizing the organisation, the op-
erational level will continue to exist, at least for the foreseeable future. 
It is, however, beyond the scope of this study to question the role of the 
operational level today or to consider whether different levels of war 
should be conflated or not. The objective of this study is to analyse the 
driving forces behind the development of this level of war, and why it 
in particular came under pressure after the turn of the century. In the 
conclusion, I will outline some thoughts on the way forward for the 
operational level.
A review of the literature on the subject  
– the lack of a study for Norway 
Although much has been written about security and defence since 
1970, there is limited literature on the subject of this study. In ad-
dition, Cold War studies of the military adopted a technological or 
political science approach. When studied from those angles, the use 
and development of the military was to some extent predictable. Since 
the end of the Cold War, however, concepts such as war and mili-
tary force have become less predictable, making it necessary to ana-
lyse the phenomena from new angles and place them within a wider 
context. Therefore it seems essential to discuss developments in the 
light of theories drawn from the social sciences and the humanities. 
4 Norwegian Armed Forces, Forsvarets fellesoperative doktrine [Norwegian Armed Forces 
Joint Operational Doctrine] (Oslo: Norwegian Defence and Command and Staff Col-
lege, 2007), pp. 32 and 57.
5 Ibid.; D. A. Macgregor, “Future battle: The Merging Levels of War”, Parameters, vol. 
22, no. 4 (1992): 33–47.
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My objective is to explore a development closely linked to strategy and 
security policy and to identify the factors influencing it. Such theoreti-
cal perspectives may provide additional insights, although it is not my 
intention to verify or falsify the theories as such. For obvious reasons 
I have chosen to use the international literature on civil-military rela-
tions and I have made a selection of theoretical perspectives to place the 
Norwegian development in a wider context.  
Two works deal with the development of the operational level in 
Norway: Kjell Inge Bjerga’s Enhet som våpen – Øverstkommanderende i 
Nord-Norge 1948–2002,6 and Norsk forsvarshistorie 1970–2000, volume 
5, Allianseforsvar i endring,7 written by Jacob Børresen, Gullow Gjeseth 
and Rolf Tamnes. They are based on studies of the archives, official 
documents, literature and interviews with central participants. Both 
works deal with the development of doctrine and its influence at the 
operational level. They do not, however, contain any of the theoretical 
perspectives mentioned above and do not place the development of the 
operational level within a broader social context. 
As already mentioned, there is no tradition in Norway for mili-
tary studies within a broad economic, political and social context.8 
Although the social implications inherent in this problem have been 
difficult to explain empirically from a Norwegian perspective, three 
works should be mentioned. Mot et avnasjonalisert forsvar?,9 edited by 
Janne Haaland Matlary and Øyvind Østerud, highlights national and 
international trends and their influence on the changes in Norwegian 
defence. Secondly, Norske makteliter and Den fragmenterte staten offer val-
uable information on the role of defence and its position in Norwegian 
society.10 Arne Røksund’s article in the latter book, “Forsvaret mellom 
politisk styring og fagmilitær uavhengighet” also treats the historical 
6 Kjell I. Bjerga, Enhet som våpen. Øverstkommanderende i Nord-Norge 1948–2002 [Unity as 
a Weapon – Commander in Chief of North Norway 1948–2002] (Bergen: Eide forlag, 
2002).
7 Jacob Børresen, Gullow Gjeseth and Rolf Tamnes, Allianseforsvar i endring. Norsk fors-
varshistorie, vol. 5, 1970–2000 [The changing joint defence. Norwegian Defence His-
tory 1970–2000] (Bergen: Eide forlag, 2004).
8 Rolf Hobson and Tom Kristiansen, Militærmakt, krig og historie. En innføring i forsknin-
gen fra Clausewitz til våre dager [Military power, war and history. An introduction, from 
Clausewitz to the present], IFS Info, no. 6 (Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Defence 
Studies, 1995), p. 6
9 Janne H. Matlary and Øyvind Østerud, eds, Mot et avnasjonalisert forsvar? [Toward a 
denationalised defence?] (Oslo: Abstrakt forlag, 2005).
10 Trygve Gulbrandsen, et al., Norske makteliter [Norwegian power élites] (Oslo: Gylden-
dal akademisk, 2002); Bent S. Tranøy and Øyvind Østerud, eds, Den fragmenterte staten 
[The fragmented state] (Oslo: Gyldendal norsk forlag, 2001).
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relationship between politics and the military in Norway up to 2001.11 
None of these works present a theoretical perspective or focuses on the 
operational level in particular. 
As for international literature, two classic works stand out with 
regard to the development of military power in society. Samuel P. 
Huntington’s The Soldier and The State – Theory and Politics of Civil-
Military Relations and The Professional Soldier – a social and political por-
trait written by Morris Janowitz. Both studies provide thorough theo-
retical perspectives on the development of military institutions at the 
outset of the Cold War, with links to strategy, security policy and so-
cial development. The classical perspectives of Samuel P. Huntington’s 
views on the military profession and civilian-military relations seem rel-
evant. His approach belongs to the social sciences, though in some 
respects also touches on the humanities. His perspectives are closely 
linked to strategy and security policy, and identify the driving forces 
of institutional development. Placing the military profession within 
his concept of conservative realism, puts the Norwegian case in a very 
conventional and Western tradition that may have some explanatory 
power. It goes straight to the heart of the balance between political 
control and military autonomy; a source of friction which is of con-
cern in most Western democracies. On the other hand, one might well 
ask whether Huntington’s perspectives are relevant today, especially to 
analyses of Norway. Huntington wrote his study five decades ago influ-
enced by the Cold War, and there has been much research in this area 
since. Moreover, Huntington was concerned with the United States 
as a superpower with a professionalised officer corps, and showed lit-
tle interest in small states with a officer corps based on conscription. 
Despite this, his perspectives may go some way to explaining the early 
establishment and growth of the operational level of war in Norway. 
The establishment in Norway of such autonomous and purely military 
institutions, based on officers’ wish for professional independence, flex-
ibility and freedom of action, largely conforms to his interpretation of 
objective civilian control of the military and of officers as conservative 
realists. According to his theory, the military should maximise its own 
organisation and build institutions to be as well prepared and suited 
to its tasks as possible. The establishment of an autonomous opera-
tional level should also serve to protect their activities from political 
11 Arne Røksund, “Forsvaret mellom politisk styring og fagmilitær uavhengighet” [The 
Defence between political control and independent professionalism], in Den fragmen-
terte staten, eds. Tranøy and Østerud.
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micro-management and to maintain professional independence, flex-
ibility and freedom of action. It could be argued that Huntington’s 
“strong objective civilian control” contributed to the growth and ex-
pansion of the operational level of war in Norway. It may also explain 
in part why Norway was slow to cut back its command structure after 
the Cold War. During the 1990s governments sought to save money 
and strengthen civilian control of the military. However, the hesitant 
cuts indicate that civilian control was insufficient and weak.
I have also considered Morris Janowitz’s military sociology, as pre-
sented in his book The Professional Soldier. His perspectives could be 
relevant with regard to long-term social trends and their effects on 
the evolution of the military as a group. However, they seem less rel-
evant to this study since he does not discuss thoroughly the everyday 
political management and control of the military. They are, moreover, 
not closely linked to strategy, security policy and the driving forces of 
institutional development. 
I also wish to mention The Postmodern Military by Charles Moskos 
et al., Humane Warfare by Christopher Coker and Armed Servants, Agency 
oversight, and civil-military relations by Peter D. Feaver.12 They provide 
important and relevant information on the development of military 
power in post-modern societies and civil-military relations in Western 
democratic states. The two latter authors also treat highly relevant 
theoretical issues, but do not focus on the development of the opera-
tional level in particular. 
None of the literature mentioned so far, however, discusses the 
most recent developments. Research covering the operational level 
since the turn of the century, the period during which the most signifi-
cant changes have taken place, hardly exists in Norway. I will return 
to this in chapter 4. Let us first go back and consider the develop-
ment of Norwegian institutions at the operational level from the very 
beginning. 
A brief outline of the chapters
The following chapters describe and explain the institutional develop-
ment of the operational level. In chapter 2 I treat the period 1970-
2000, and chapter 3 deals with the subsequent period. The chapters 
12 Christopher Coker, Humane Warfare (London: Routledge, 2001); Peter D. Feaver, 
Armed Servants, Agency, oversight, and civil-military relations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 2003); Charles C. Moskos, David R. Segal and John A. Williams 
eds., The Postmodern Military (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
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begin with a chronological description. I then attempt to answer and 
explain the questions raised. My explanation is structured in accord-
ance with the following factors (1) the strategic importance of the 
northern flank (2) Norway in NATO (3) the changing character of war 
(4) financial resources and (5) new technology. In chapter 4, I present 
Huntington’s theory and the theoretical perspectives which contribute 
towards explaining developments, and conclude by discussing the de-
velopment of these perspectives. In chapter 5 I sum up and conclude 
my study, and I have taken the liberty of presenting my thoughts and 
ideas on the future shape of the operational level in Norway. 
 12 Defence and Security Studies 2-2009
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Chapter 2
The operational level 1970–2000
The military system has one mission and one organisation. Integrated 
planning and unified leadership will be required for all operations.
Hauge II Committee in 1969
The building of institutions
This was the period of the Cold War between the Western Powers 
and the Warsaw pact. Both sides considered NATO’s northern flank, 
which basically consisted of Norway and its adjacent oceans, as stra-
tegically highly important. In this context, Norway, perceiving itself 
to be threatened, had to seek protection under NATO’s umbrella to 
strengthen its defences against a possible invasion from the Soviet 
Union. As Norway itself possessed limited resources, allied reinforce-
ments and infrastructure constituted the main pillars of its defence. 
The relationship with the Alliance became vital. During the 1990s, 
however, Norway saw its strategic importance lessen. Western mili-
tary strategic interest in the northern flank declined. To some extent, 
Russia maintained its strategic interests in the northern regions, not 
only militarily but also economically, keeping Norway in uncertainty 
with regards to defence and security policy.
In 1967 a committee was established to examine and report on the 
regional management of the armed forces, the Hauge II Committee, 
chaired by Jens Christian Hauge, erstwhile chief of the Norwegian re-
sistance movement during the Second World War, minister of defence 
after the war and later Supreme Court advocate. The Committee’s re-
mit, as laid down by Royal Decree of 13 October 1967, was to recom-
mend an institutional solution for the operational level correspond-
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ing to the strategic level solution adopted for Headquarters Defence 
Command, which at that time was being unrolled in Oslo. 13
Based on the recommendations of this committee, two joint de-
fence commands at the operational level were established in 1971-
72, placed directly under the Chief of Defence and his strategic 
Headquarters Defence Command, one in northern Norway and one 
in southern Norway.14 A more symbolic position as Commander-in-
Chief had been established in northern Norway as early as 1949, with 
a view to coordinating the defence of the region and the contribu-
tions of the various services. Experience drawn from this work served 
as a source of inspiration, but it was not until the establishment of 
Defence Command North Norway and Defence Command South 
Norway that Norway had an operational level with its own, desig-
nated headquarters.15 Until then the forces in the north and south 
were under the leadership of each service and controlled from differ-
ent geographical areas. 
With the new joint defence commands in place, two powerful op-
erational leaders were supported by the commanders from each service, 
and with a far closer integration between the services than earlier. The 
defence commands were to be led by a Commander-in-Chief, a lieuten-
ant-general or a vice-admiral. To conduct direct leadership of ground, 
sea and air operations respectively, commanders from each service with 
their own operational centre were put in place. The commanders, for 
the most part major generals or rear admirals, were advisers to the 
Commander-in-Chief and responsible for translating operational de-
cisions into the proper language of each service and maintaining the 
highest possible standard. They thus exercised operational control of 
all units in their own services on behalf of the Commander-in-Chief. 
The commanders were given an influential position, which served to 
maintain professional standards, a reliable leadership of operational 
activities; “the highest possible competence and authority” were ex-
pected of them.16 
At the same time a joint operational centre, superior to the service-
based operational centre, was established to facilitate leadership of the 
13  Oppnevning av utvalget for Forsvarets regionale ledelse [The appointment of a Board of In-
quiry into the Regional Command of the Norwegian Armed Forces], Order in Coun-
cil, 13 October 1967; Stortinget, Forsvarets regionale ledelse [The Norwegian Defence’ 
regional command], Recommendation to the Storting, no. 55 (1969), p. 3.
14  Bjerga, Enhet som våpen, pp. 47, 50, 116-118, 129, 143.
15  Stortinget, Forsvarets regionale ledelse, p. 6; Bjerga, Enhet som våpen, pp. 12, 30-35, 102.
16  Bjerga, Enhet som våpen, pp. 7-8.
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joint operations.17 A joint staff with its own proper functions was also 
established, complete with functional sections for personnel, intelli-
gence and security, operations, logistics and signals. The headquarters 
also had a quarters command of their own. 
Thus the operational headquarters were given two different crite-
ria for separation at the same level in the organisation. One was the 
functional separation of the joint staff, which came to be called the 
G or J structure. The other was the separation of the services rep-
resented by the commanders and their staff. Immediately under the 
Commander-in-Chief a chief of staff was in charge of the staff coordi-
nation at headquarters and across services and functions.18 
Defence Command North Norway was declared operational in 
Reitan in Bodø on 1 September 1971.19 Its mission was primarily 
to plan and coordinate the tasks of all three services in the region in 
peacetime, crisis and wartime, to prepare the reception of allied forces 
and maintain civilian-military cooperation within the scope of total 
defence. Its geographical area of responsibility comprised Norway’s 
territory and air space north of the 65th parallel north, including the 
territorial waters of Norway and the archipelagos of Svalbard, Bjørnøya 
and Jan Mayen.
Defence Command South Norway was established in Oslo in 
January 1972 on the same model as that of North Norway. The com-
mander-in-chief of South Norway was given more or less the same 
responsibilities as his counterpart in Northern Norway, but south of 
the 65th parallel. The headquarters, however, were structured slightly 
differently. At the outset the maritime operational centre was placed 
in Jåttå in Stavanger while the rest of the headquarters, including the 
ground and air operational centres, was located in Oslo. 
Both commanders-in-chief were under national command in 
peacetime, and also under NATO command with a view to allied plan-
ning, exercises and war.20 However, the joint defence commands were 
still manned by national personnel only and answered in peacetime 
to the Norwegian Chief of Defence. The commanders-in-chief con-
sequently had two roles, a NATO role reporting to Commander-in-
Chief Allied Forces Northern Europe and Supreme Allied Commander 
Atlantic in the USA, and a national role, reporting to the national 
17  Børresen et al., Allianseforsvar i endring, p. 296, Bjerga, Enhet som våpen, p. 110.
18  See appendix A – Command Structures and Command Relationships.
19  Bjerga, Enhet som våpen, p. 115.
20  See appendix A.
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Chief of Defence. In crisis and wartime the staff would be reinforced 
by both national and allied personnel. 
Although the integrated solution was controversial in the serv-
ices, in terms of organisation it was considered to be progressive and 
well-functioning.21 In 1975 the then Minister of Defence Alv Jakob 
Fostervoll and the Chief of Defence Herman Fredrik Zeiner Gundersen 
stated that this new organisation had been a positive development for 
Norway and the armed forces. It had “made the joint operational co-
ordination better than before” and “created a better understanding and 
solidarity in the armed forces”.22 The new operational level made coor-
dinated planning and conduct of joint operations possible, in which el-
ements from the different services functioned as an integrated unit. In 
a critical situation, minor or major, the joint defence commands could 
respond quickly and deploy the forces required immediately, be they 
individual elements from one service to demonstrate Norwegian con-
trol of territorial waters, to intercept a Soviet plane violating national 
air space, or to respond to a small-scale aggression on the ground in 
the border regions. The Commander-in-Chief of the defence command 
was now able to exercise unity of command and to coordinate and 
control the activities from minute to minute, giving unity of effort. 
At the same time, military requirements within services were tak-
en care of by the commanders under one common leader,23 a fact which 
helped create a powerful community around the commanders-in-chief 
and growing confidence in both within the services. To give both com-
manders-in-chief responsibility and authority equivalent to the Chief 
of Defence in their respective regions was a wise solution, not least as 
they were also relieved from certain duties of secondary importance.24 
A committee, which at a later stage assessed the supreme leadership 
of the armed forces, also came to the same positive conclusion.25 We 
may conclude that with this new organisational structure Norway had 
21 Bjørnar Kibsgaard, “Norges nasjonale kommandostruktur og forholdet til NATO” 
[Norway’s national command structure and the relations with NATO] in Komman-
dospørsmålet på nordflanken – utviklingen i to formative perioder, ed. Rolf Tamnes, IFS Info, 
no. 4 (Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, 2001), p. 28.
22 Stortinget, Erfaringer med den nye organisasjon for Forsvarets ledelse [Experiences with the 
new Defence Staff organisation], Report to the Storting, no. 63 (1974-1975).
23 Kibsgaard, “Norges nasjonale kommandostruktur”, p. 28.
24 Ministry of Defence, Hovedretningslinjer for utforming av Forsvarets regionale og lokale or-
ganisasjon [General lines to creating the regional and local organisation of the Armed 
Forces], Report to the Storting, no. 54 (1969–1970), pp. 8 and 13.
25 Headquarters Defence Command Norway, Innstilling fra utvalget til vurdering av For-
svarets øverste ledelse [Report of the Military Leadership Inquiry], Norwegian Armed 
Forces’ archives, dated 12 April 1991.
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placed itself in the forefront. The same structure later inspired the 
development of NATO’s Combined Joint Task Force headquarters.26 
As the Commander-in-Chief South Norway was in charge of a 
region considered less exposed to the Soviet Union than Northern 
Norway, it was given lower priority. During the Cold War, prepared-
ness was required in the north, and the time factor was seen as more 
critical than in the south. The separation of headquarters in the south 
between Oslo and Stavanger also made it difficult to plan, direct and 
execute joint operations. Moreover, Defence Command Northern 
Norway was given responsibility for all large-scale NATO exercises 
and also a wider area of responsibility as a consequence of Norway’s 
extended jurisdiction over ocean waters. In the 1970s and 1980s more 
duties connected to surveillance, jurisdiction and exercise of author-
ity in the oceans were accordingly transferred.27 Defence Command 
South Norway had lower priority, and it was not until 1987 that all 
HQ functions were gathered under the same roof in extensive, modern 
underground facilities in Jåttå near Stavanger.28 
Institutions at the operational level were soon to become centres 
of attention, given high priority in national budgets and assigned nu-
merous duties.29 They were considered as pillars of the Alliance and its 
commitment to the defence of Norway.30 Both headquarters were given 
important functions in NATO’s command structure. They acted as ba-
sis for the landing of allied reinforcements and also in connection with 
allied joint warfare on the northern flank. Their strength was shown 
through increasingly frequent and successful allied joint operational 
exercises.31 Early in the 1970s allied manoeuvres in Norway seldom de-
ployed more than 4,000 men a year. Throughout the 1980s the number 
increased many times over.32 The number of visitors also grew. In 1969 
26 Kibsgaard, “Norges nasjonale kommandostruktur”, p. 28.
27 Bjerga, Enhet som våpen, pp. 112, 132, 152; Børresen et al., Allianseforsvar i endring, p. 
295.
28 Ministry of Defence, Hovedretningslinjer for Forsvarets virksomhet i tiden 1989–
1993 [General lines for the activities of the Norwegian Armed Forces 1989-1993], 
Report to the Storting, no. 54 (1987-1988), p. 151; Stortinget, Innstilling fra forsvar-
skomiteen om NATOs nye kommandostruktur og stedsvalg for NATOs nye komman-
do i Norge [Report of the Standing Committee on Defence on NATO’s new command 
structure and choice of location for the new NATO Command in Norway], Recom-
mendation to the Storting, no. 2 (1992–1993), p. 1; Børresen et al., Allianseforsvar i 
endring, p. 296.
29 Norwegian Defence Command, Vurdering av Forsvarets øverste ledelse, p. 1. 
30 Børresen et al., Allianseforsvar i endring, p. 145.
31 Ibid., p. 53; Sigurd Frisvold, General and former Norwegian Chief of Defence, inter-
view with by author, 29 March 2007; and Lieutenant-General Thorstein Skiaker 28 
March 2007.
32 Børresen et al., Allianseforsvar i endring, p. 97.
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Defence Command North Norway hosted up to 120 senior Norwegian 
visitors and allied officers. In 1976 the figure was 354, most of whom 
were senior allied officers or other visitors from abroad.33 
In the 1970s and 1980s the defence commands were given respon-
sibility for planning extensive allied joint operational manoeuvres, 
preparing to receive significant allied forces and to store considerable 
quantities of allied materiel. Large sums of money were spent on the 
headquarters themselves.34 The fear of nuclear attack led to the con-
struction of expensive plants with modern communication infrastruc-
tures in the north, east and southwest of Norway – deep underground 
in Reitan near Bodø, Holmenkollen in Oslo, and later Jåttå, Stavanger. 
The headquarters were staffed by personnel whose duties were to 
concentrate on preparedness rather than peaceful activities. At Defence 
Command South Norway, the number of personnel was first esti-
mated to be 120 officers and civilians, whereas at Defence Command 
North Norway the estimation was 200.35 It turned out that Defence 
Command South Norway would need 140, and as many as 400 offic-
ers and civilians were needed at Defence Command North Norway to 
ensure continuous operation.36 Full mobilisation would call for three 
times this number.37 
Gradually it also became important for officers to serve at one of 
the operational headquarters as it offered valuable training and rep-
resented an important step up the career ladder. Norwegian officers 
were told to develop their competence for later service in Norway and 
NATO’s other command structures. The Chief of Defence put it thus 
“when moving officers to advanced positions in the military system, 
emphasis will be placed on their having experience of service in the 
integrated staff detachments”.38 In short, the joint operational profes-
sional environment was to be found at the operational headquarters of 
Norway.39 
The 1990s were marked by steady development, although the fi-
nancing, staffing and joint operational capacity of defence commands were 
in a more precarious state. The south would enjoy considerable growth 
while the north would experience a slight weakening of its position. 
33 Bjerga, Enhet som våpen, pp. 92, 142-143.
34 Ibid., p. 87.
35 Oppnevning av utvalget for Forsvarets regionale ledelse, p. 8. 
36 Norwegian Defence Command, Vurdering av Forsvarets øverste ledelse, p. 51.
37 Bjerga, Enhet som våpen, p. 112.
38 Stortinget, Erfaringer med den nye organisasjon, p. 5.
39 Bjerga, Enhet som våpen, p. 185.
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In 1990 the Chief of Defence established a committee under the 
leadership of major general Hjalmar Inge Sunde. The task of the Sunde 
committee was to downscale the central military organisation and ad-
just it to new allied frameworks and identify ways whereby a function-
al and viable leadership structure could be maintained despite a reduc-
tion of 25 per cent.40 The two joint operational defence commands 
were also involved. The committee recommended making the deepest 
cuts in the staff of Defence Command South Norway. These recom-
mendations were unacceptable to the Chief of Defence, who instead 
suggested a 25 per cent cut across the board at both defence commands 
and the Headquarters Defence Command. In his view, there had to be 
two defence commands operating in peacetime.41 Following up this 
decision was, however, time consuming. The cuts were considered un-
realistic for the functioning of the structure, and the recommendations 
of the committee were rejected. Until 1997, operating expenses in 
Reitan were reduced by 17 per cent, whereas in Jåttå they increased 
by 19 per cent.42 
The funding of Defence Command South Norway was related to 
the re-organisation of NATO’s command structure and a general for-
tification of the headquarters.43 In 1994 NATO established a joint op-
erational allied headquarters in Jåttå, Joint Headquarters North (JHQ 
North), localised and closely integrated with Defence Command South 
Norway. It turned out to be a good solution for Defence Command 
South Norway. The command, considered Norway’s anchorage in 
NATO’s command structure, was given higher priority than before. 
Gradually, the more extensive NATO exercises were carried out in 
Jåttå instead of Reitan.44 Jåtta staff grew in number, making it more 
attractive to serve there. In combination with the relocation of in-
ternational personnel with considerable knowledge of modern joint 
operations, the armed forces gradually developed a high level of pro-
ficiency in commanding and controlling joint military operations at 
headquarters.45 For Vice Admiral Bjørnar Kibsgaard, commander-in-
chief 1993-96, it was all about “giving us headquarters for joint op-
40 Norwegian Defence Command, Vurdering av Forsvarets øverste ledelse, pp. 1–2.
41 Kibsgaard, “Norges nasjonale kommandostruktur”, p. 31.
42 Børresen et al., Allianseforsvar i endring, p. 314.
43 Ibid.
44 Frisvold, interview; Thorstein Skiaker, Lieutenant-General, interview by author, 28 
March 2007; Bjerga, Enhet som våpen, p. 207.
45 Frisvold, interview; and Skiaker, interview.
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erations at [Principal Subordinate Command] level with a capacity 
and competence never before seen in Norway”.46 
On the other hand, staff numbers at Defence Command North 
Norway were somewhat reduced during the same period. Its joint 
operational competence began to disintegrate. As funding was cut 
back, the integrated command was split up; the ground forces com-
mander and his operational centre were transferred further north, 
from Bodø to Harstad in 1991. A small representational section was 
all that remained at Defence Command North Norway.47 Staffing was 
reduced, making it less attractive for officers to serve in Reitan. After 
the move training in ground force operations took place at District 
Command North Norway in Harstad, chiefly because the large-scale 
winter manoeuvres Black Frost and Cold Winter were carried out un-
der the leadership of the district command.48 Consequently, Defence 
Command North Norway lost some of its capacity to run ground force 
operations.49 Furthermore, in 1999 the air control centre in Reitan was 
moved to Sørreisa. The result was once again a reduction of personnel, 
and loss of one of its functions and its air control expertise.50 
However, in the course of the 1990s both defence commands were 
given new and important missions connected to crisis management at 
home and abroad. In line with NATO trends, based on the new stra-
tegic concept of 1991,51 Norway was increasingly eager to take part 
in international operations. The Kosovo crisis in the spring of 1999 
revealed weaknesses in the command system, and on 6 March 2000 
responsibility for operational control and logistics related to national 
contribution of forces and staff in international operations was trans-
ferred from the Chief Operations in Headquarters Defence Command 
to the Commander-in-Chief South Norway.52 The coordinated respon-
sibility for international operations enabled further growth at Defence 
Command South Norway.53 The Defence Command later proved 
its ability to handle present-day crisis management. In 2000 the 
46 Kibsgaard, “Norges nasjonale kommandostruktur”, p. 31.
47 Bjerga, Enhet som våpen, pp. 100 and 203.
48 Frisvold, interview.
49 Ibid., Skiaker, interview.
50 Bjerga, Enhet som våpen, p. 203.
51 NATO, The Alliance’s Strategic Concept agreed by the Heads of State and Government partici-
pating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Rome, 8 November 1991 [online 2 Jul 
2008].
52 Norwegian Ministry of Defence, Kosovo-krisen: Nasjonal rapport [The Kosovo crisis: A 
national report], p. 9; Børresen et al., Allianseforsvar i endring, p. 230; Bjerga, Enhet som 
våpen, p. 207; Frisvold, interview.
53 Frisvold, interview; and Skiaker, interview.
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Commander-in-Chief South Norway, Lieutenant General Thorstein 
Skiaker, was entrusted with command of the KFOR 5, NATO’s opera-
tion in Kosovo. This mission was given high priority by Norwegian 
authorities. Afterwards it was described as “proof that the command in 
Stavanger was relevant in facing the challenges of today”.54 The mis-
sion was carried out in a very satisfying manner – sufficient to “attract 
attention and make an impression within NATO”.55
In the same period Defence Command North Norway became 
no less important with its high-level presence and crisis manage-
ment in the northern regions. The dialogue between Commander-in-
Chief North Norway and the military leaders on the Kola Peninsula 
was decisive during the rescue operation following the foundering 
of the Kursk submarine in 2000. Vice Admiral Einar Skorgen, who 
was Commander-in-Chief in North Norway during the salvage op-
eration, later stated that “the importance of the personal confidence 
established between the Commander-in-Chief North Norway and the 
commander of the Northern Fleet, was decisive for the success of the 
salvage operation”.56 The Kursk operation would remain an example 
of the importance of competent leadership in crisis management in 
the north. 
To sum up, the period 1970-2000 was marked by the institution-
al establishment and growth of extensive operational responsibilities, 
increased manning, important joint operational competence building 
and strengthened ability to execute command and control of joint op-
erations. While Defence Command North Norway was slightly weak-
ened in the 1990s, Defence Command South Norway went in the op-
posite direction. At the same time both joint operational commands 
became increasingly important in crisis management at home as well 
as abroad.
54 Skiaker, interview; Børresen et al., Allianseforsvar i endring, p. 315; Bjerga, Enhet som 
våpen, p. 208.
55 Frisvold, interview.
56 Einar Skorgen, “‘Kursk’ sett fra Reitan” [Kursk seen from Reitan], Norsk Militært Tid-
skrift, vol. 169, no. 12 (2000): pp. 4–8.
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Explaining expansion
The strategic importance of the northern flank
The first explanation for the institutional establishment and increase 
of the northern command was the growing strategic importance of 
the northern flank. By the end of the 1960s the Alliance and the US 
were showing less interest in the northern regions than in the 1950s. 
However, with the build-up of Russian forces on the Kola Peninsula, 
particularly the Northern fleet, this situation was soon to change. The 
fear that Russian submarines could cut supply lines across the Atlantic 
created a common allied interest in securing a strong allied defence of 
Norwegian territories. 
To defend the flanks and secure allied sea supremacy in the North 
Sea became vital.57 The Northern Fleet had to be stopped from oper-
ating freely in the Atlantic. The only Russian access to the Atlantic 
from the Kola Peninsula was via the North Sea. It was important to 
prevent the Russians from occupying northern Norway, which would 
give them a better starting point for operations in the Atlantic.58 The 
Norwegian fjords and ports were ice-free and could therefore func-
tion as suitable deployment areas. Moreover, the deep fjords offered 
excellent hiding places. Uncertainty and nervousness about Soviet in-
tentions must be seen in the light of its policy on Afghanistan and 
Poland. By increasing offensive capacity the great powers were ready 
to respond at “short notice in the event of an attack”.59 
As Norway’s ability to fight off an invasion was limited, allied re-
inforcements and further expansion of the allied infrastructure became 
the main pillars of defence.60 To counter a Soviet attack quickly and 
effectively, it was important to earmark forces and conduct exercises in 
the region. This factor became very important for the establishment 
and growth of the operational level in Norway. 
Firstly, after 1970 the contingent of Norwegian and allied forces 
earmarked for deployment in Norway grew considerably. The force 
level, the combination of preparedness and force structure, increased 
considerably. At its height, there were plans to deploy more than 700 
57 Børresen et al., Allianseforsvar i endring, p. 32.
58 Bjerga, Enhet som våpen, p. 132.
59 Kjetil Henriksen and Torgeir E. Sæveraas, Et militært universalmiddel? Amerikansk 
“Maneuver Warfare” og norsk doktrineutvikling [A military panacea? US “Maneuver War-
fare” and Norwegian doctrinal development], Oslo Files on Defence and Security, no. 
1 (Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, 2007), p. 85.
60 Bjerga, Enhet som våpen, p. 132.
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planes in Norway, and more than 50,000 allied soldiers were ear-
marked for Norway. By the end of the 1980s, Norway was regarded as 
a prospective deployment area for as many as nine detachments at the 
brigade and division level.61 In addition, Norway disposed of a poten-
tial force of almost 500,000 men.62 It became important for Norway, 
therefore, to handle the increasing complexity of the operations and 
the extensive area of control of the substantial forces involved in the 
country’s defence. The extensive force structure demanded an inde-
pendent level of command. A condition for meeting this challenge was 
a well-functioning operational level of sufficient capacity. 
As far as the high level of forces and the needs of warfare were 
concerned, the administration needed to be organised and manned 
in a robust manner, focusing primarily on preparedness rather than 
peace.63 The operational level had to be flexible in order to provide 
“opportunities to concentrate the forces around ongoing primary de-
fence activities at all times without radical changes of command rela-
tionships or structures”.64 The regional distribution of forces was not 
fixed and would vary in accordance with strategic requirements and 
preparedness. With powerful joint operational defence commands the 
integrity of the command system would be ensured, according to the 
military leadership. 
Secondly, large-scale manoeuvres with a substantial contingent of 
allied forces were also carried out. At the most, 24,000 soldiers from 
different countries were involved.65 For the defence commands the in-
creased activity meant higher priority, which again provided training 
in decisive and necessary leadership and conduct of joint operations. 
Manoeuvres grew to such an extent that significant demands were 
placed on command and control. All these activities required reliable 
and efficient leadership. It was vital to develop capacity at the national 
level in campaign planning, the conduct and evaluation of the large-
scale invasion defence exercises in combined joint operations involving 
many countries. Headquarters held responsibility. In particular, the 
large-scale allied manoeuvres in northern Norway, under the leader-
ship of Defence Command North Norway, were considered valuable 
as they provided considerable leadership experience. Throughout the 
61 Henriksen and Sæveraas, Et militært universalmiddel?, p. 111.
62 Børresen et al., Allianseforsvar i endring, pp. 372–373.
63 Oppnevning av utvalget for Forsvarets regionale ledelse, p. 5.
64 Ibid.
65 Bjerga, Enhet som våpen, pp. 168–169.
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1970s and 1980s these exercises laid the foundation for robust joint 
operational competence at both headquarters.66 
Thirdly, the concept of reinforcement and revival of conventional 
warfare after 1967 required more extensive preparations to enable the 
rapid transfer and deployment of Norwegian and allied forces.67 A 
Russian attack might come quickly and unexpectedly, with the flanks 
were exposed to small-scale attacks.68 Storage of foreign materiel for 
the large-scale earmarked forces was vital in this respect.69 As these 
forces might have to be deployed very quickly, important materiel had 
to be stored in Norway. Preparations and plans would have to be made 
in peacetime for the transfer and reception of allied forces. Institutions 
at the operational level became key factors here. 
Parallel to their growing strategic importance, the economic im-
portance of the northern areas also increased. In the 1970s Norway’s 
jurisdiction over the oceans was extended to 200 nautical miles beyond 
territorial waters. At the same time the demand for fish and petro-
leum grew around the globe and the strategic importance of maritime 
resources increased.70 For the defence commands this meant new as-
signments as well as an influential position in the field of surveillance, 
the exercise of sovereignty, jurisdiction and control of fisheries, in par-
ticular in the northern regions. These new tasks contributed towards 
a coordinated and flexible leadership, which at all times was capable 
of conducting operations with the necessary special competence, also 
in peacetime. 
At the beginning of the 1980s the relationship between the USA 
and the Soviet Union deteriorated and the term “second cold war” 
gained currency.71 In the 1980s the northern flank again increased in 
strategic importance in connection with the new maritime strategy of the 
USA.72 The USA inaugurated an advanced deployment of naval ves-
sels above and below the sea to wear down the Soviet Union. Aircraft 
carrier operations in advanced positions were active within range of 
the Kola Peninsula. In this respect the defence commands, Defence 
66 Ibid., p. 133.
67 NATO, Overall strategic concept for the defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
Area. MC 14/3 (Final) (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1967), pp. 3 
and 10.
68 Ibid., p. 9.
69 Børresen et al., Allianseforsvar i endring, p. 373.
70 NOU, Forsvarskommisjonen av 1974 [The 1974 Defence Commission], no. 9 (Oslo: 
Norwegian Official Reports, 1978), p. 32. Submitted to the Ministry of Defence 
March 1978.
71 Henriksen and Sæveraas, Et militært universalmiddel?, p. 85.
72 Bjerga, Enhet som våpen, pp. 148–151.
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Command North Norway in particular, now became important to the 
command of sea and airborne forces in their own region, forces which 
needed a coordinated and unified leadership. 
Norway in NATO
Another reason for the establishment and growth of the operational 
level was Norway’s relationship with NATO. With the increasing 
strategic importance of the northern flank relations with the Alliance 
became crucial. Seen from the perspective of minor states it was im-
portant to defend national interests and influence defence planning for 
Norway. Again, the defence commands played a central role, not only 
where Norway was concerned, but within NATO as well. 
From a national perspective the close integration of the headquarters 
and their formal standing in NATO’s chain of command were impor-
tant for several reasons. Firstly, participation in an allied command 
system, formed to lead Norwegian and allied forces in the defence of 
Norway, was crucial in order to secure NATO support in case of an 
armed attack.73 Norway itself was not able to counter an attack by a 
great power. Speaking as early as the mid-1960s the Government de-
scribed as “one of the primary tasks of the Commander-in-Chief North 
Norway is to contribute towards strengthening the interest of the USA 
and other NATO countries in the northern regions and thereby oblig-
ing them to defend Norway”.74 Building positive relations between 
Norwegian and allied commanders in peacetime was regarded as one 
way of achieving this. It also seemed important to strengthen the 
Headquarters position and role in the NATO joint command system 
and ensure as high a level of activity as possible. Secondly, the de-
fence commands provided Norway with an opportunity to influence 
defence planning within NATO. The defence commands’ contact with 
lateral and superior NATO commands was positive and direct.75 The 
institutions acted as Norway’s public face in NATO, thus connect-
ing Norway to the more powerful supporting powers, the USA and 
Britain, and to the defence of Europe as well.76 The new organisation, 
with its establishment of defence commands, enabled an approach 
which took account of Norwegian interests. 
73 NOU, Forsvarskommisjonen av 1974, p. 44.
74 Bjerga, Enhet som våpen, p. 140.
75 Børresen et al., Allianseforsvar i endring, p. 56.
76 Ibid., p. 374.
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Thirdly, being integrated with NATO’s command structure made 
it possible to acquire key defence planning capability which could 
later “be redirected to our own organisation at home”.77 This was nec-
essary in order to preserve national control of military activities in 
Norway. Politically, only Norwegian commanding officers in the allied 
chain of command could command allied forces in Norway.78 Norway 
wanted a command system with the capability and reliability neces-
sary to prevent the allies from retaining national control when they 
deployed their forces in Norway. Based on the new criteria of war-
fare and technological development, operations had gradually become 
more advanced and complicated. It was vital, therefore, to maintain 
capability in this field. Were Norway not to maintain and develop 
such capabilities in peacetime, it would be impossible to provide a 
competent and efficient system in a crisis or war. If Norway proved 
incompetent, allied forces themselves might establish their own com-
mand systems. This would undermine national control, which was 
undesirable. National control was regarded as important.79 Moreover, 
Norway’s screening policy implied restraint to avoid teasing the 
Russian bear. Manoeuvres in the eastern part of Norway were subject 
to certain limitations. Headquarters under Norwegian control were 
given an important function in controlling the activities. 
Seen from the Alliance perspective, substantial joint operational head-
quarters in Norway were also important. Primarily, they must be able 
to maintain leadership of NATO’s flank defence, which was based on 
large-scale joint combined operations after 1967. An integrated com-
mand system was viewed by the Alliance as a prerequisite for this.80 
Secondly, the command structure was also viewed as important by 
the Alliance in order to detect an enemy attack as early as possible.81 
Thirdly, these arrangements acted as the foundation of a leadership in 
peacetime which would be able to quickly transfer the operational com-
77 Ibid., pp. 55–56.
78 Om delegering av myndighet i krig til sjefen for Nordkommandoen [About delegating aut-
hority in war to the Commander-in-Chief Northern Norway], Order in Council, 22 
July 1953; Om overføring av myndighet til sjefen for Nordkommandoen [About transfer-
ring authority to the Commander-in-Chief Northern Norway], Order in Council, 27 
January 1967; Om overføring av kommando over visse norske maritime styrker til Atlanter-
havskommandoen [About transferring command over certain Norwegian naval forces to 
the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic], Order in Council, 22 May 1970. See also 
Headquarters Defence Command Norway, Vurdering av Forsvarets øverste ledelse, p. 29. 
79 Rolf Tamnes, Oljealder 1965–1995 [Oil age 1965–1995], Norsk utenrikspolitikks historie 
[Norway’s foreign relations history], vol. 6 (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1995–1997), p. 23.
80 NATO, Overall strategic concept for the defense, pp. 3 and 10.
81 Ibid., p. 10.
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mand to NATO in wartime with as few changes as possible.82 In a war 
their status would be altered to allied headquarters at the operational 
level, responsible for allied operations and for the defence of each re-
gion. Thus, they would be responsible for conducting allied operations 
in Norway, which called for quick transfer of command without con-
siderable organisational changes. Defence Command North Norway 
acquired influence in the 1980s as it acted as a reliable support for the 
USA’s new maritime strategy in peacetime, crisis and wartime.
The changes in NATO’s command structure in 1994 had different 
consequences for the North and South Defence Commands. Defence 
Command South Norway’s area of responsibility was extended and re-
inforced in terms of personnel, financing and capability.83 The new 
integrated solution with NATO’s headquarters in Jåttå and increased 
activity consolidated joint operational competence at the headquar-
ters. Defence Command North Norway was placed under Defence 
Command South Norway and moved one step down the ladder in the 
NATO command structure. These changes probably indicated that the 
responsibility and role of Defence Command North Norway in case of 
invasion and threats from the east were considered less relevant by the 
Alliance. Even so, these solutions still secured positive integration and 
close ties to Norway’s allies.84 
The changing character of war
The third explanation for the establishment and growth in these in-
stitutions was the changing character of war. In this study the phrase 
“the changing character of war” highlights conceptual and doctrinal 
changes in the conduct of warfare, and the changing interests of the 
military profession. 
During the early stages of the Cold War, east and west alike devel-
oped concepts for war fighting in the European theatre based on the 
principles of attrition warfare. If deterrence failed, the material assets 
of the opponent were to be destroyed or worn down through the use 
of superior firepower and the cumulative destruction of his resources. 
Quantity seemed more important than quality and firepower more 
82 Røksund, ”Forsvaret mellom politisk styring…”, p. 134; see apendix A; also see Bjer-
ga, Enhet som våpen, p. 140 and Børresen et al., Allianseforsvar i endring, p. 55.
83 Frisvold, interview; and Skiaker, interview.
84 Ibid.; Ministry of Defence, Om NATOs nye kommandostruktur og stedsvalg for NATOs 
nye kommando i Norge [About NATO’s new command structure and choice of location 
for NATO’s new command in Norway], Proposition to the Storting no. 115 (1991–
1992), p. 6, says also that “NATO’s new command arrangement is most satisfactory to 
Norway, both militarily and politically”.
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important than mobility. Both superpowers based their preparation 
and planning on deterrence and the doctrine of massive retaliation. 
If deterrence failed, the war and the final battle would be fought in a 
brief, violent phase with large arsenals of nuclear weapons. In such a 
nuclear war scenario it became absurd to distinguish between tacti-
cal, operational and strategic levels. The war was to be fought at the 
central strategic level. 
Towards the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s a 
renewed interest in conventional warfare and the enhancement of a 
conventional capability arose. The concept of massive retaliation lost 
much of its credibility as the Soviet Union became capable of retali-
ating by a substantial nuclear attack. Thus in NATO’s new strategic 
concept of 1967 the nuclear dimension was de-emphasised in favour 
of forward defence.85 By 1967, the defence concept of the Alliance had 
moved from a doctrine of massive retaliation to flexible response. The new 
focus was on developing a strategy and conventional force structure ca-
pable of reacting according to circumstances. According to this strat-
egy, the lowest level would mean limited use of conventional military 
power along the front line, followed by a threat of escalation with full 
nuclear war as the ultimate issue.86 In other words, a war which in the 
final event was based on the concept of attrition and in which the focus 
was on quantity rather than quality.87 Even so, a debate followed as to 
whether such an arrangement would be the right solution for the situ-
ation in Europe. The Eastern block was overwhelmingly superior in 
conventional forces. Consequently, the idea of strengthening forward 
defence with conventional ground manoeuvre elements, supported by 
tactical and long-range air forces, appeared.
Conceptually, this conventional warfare was initially based to a 
large degree on attrition. 88 With Norway’s concept of large-scale joint 
invasion defence operations, it was a question of holding ground and 
gaining time until allied forces were deployed. Even so, these large 
conventional forces were directly attached to the operational level due 
to this more complicated form of warfare. This was important for the 
establishment and growth of the operational level in Norway, since 
85 NATO, Overall strategic concept for the defense.
86 Ibid., pp. 3 and 7.
87 Børresen et al., Allianseforsvar i endring, pp. 27-29.
88 Nils M. Rekkedal, Moderne krigskunst: En presentasjon av moderne militærmakt og militær-
teori [Modern art of war: A presentation of modern military power and military theory] 
(Oslo: The Norwegian Defence Staff College, 2003), pp. 481–482. Henriksen and 
Sæveraas, Et militært universalmiddel?, p. 109.
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conducting effective joint military operations now became more rel-
evant than before. In a large-scale confrontation Norway would have 
to cooperate with allied member countries and be able to conduct large 
joint operations. The deployment of these conventional forces still re-
quired a coordinated leadership. Extensive operations called for par-
ticipation of more than one service, and the integrated ground, sea and 
air operations also required thorough coordination across all services. 
One integrated command system was, as the Alliance saw it, vital.89 
From a national point of view, as the Hauge II Committee in 1969 
stated, “The military system has one mission and one organisation. 
Integrated planning and unified leadership will be required from all 
operations.”90 Its report contained the following proposal: 
There is an evident need for coordination between units from 
several services. … When an attack is launched on a region, an ef-
ficient concentration of the military forces, including an efficient 
cooperation between all armaments, will be decisive. In many cases 
all three services will be expected to cooperate, in other cases coop-
eration between two services will be required.91 
In this way, both the transition to the flexible response doctrine in 
1967 and a more conventional and joint operational concept, even 
though it was based on attrition, paved the way for the establish-
ment and development of the operational level in Norway. In 1968 
a similar solution had been established at the strategic level with the 
Headquarters Defence Command. The background was that unity of 
command and unity of effort was judged more important than main-
taining the special interest of each service. This idea was seen as deci-
sive in an operational setting in order to further develop all military 
forces and their capability for joint operations.92 Through the defence 
commands such arrangement could be continued on a regional basis.93 
As it turned out, the warfare concepts were to become more ma-
noeuvre-oriented. NATO’s new strategic concept and doctrine were 
increasingly criticised in the 1970s. It was argued that the Alliance’s 
military reliability was weakened. A renewed interest in classic manoeu-
89 Ibid., pp. 3 and 10.
90 Stortinget, Forsvarets regionale ledelse, p. 5.
91 Ibid., p. 12.
92 Røksund, ”Forsvaret mellom politisk styring …”, p. 139; Stortinget, Forsvarets regio-
nale ledelse, p. 12.
93 Stortinget, Forsvarets regionale ledelse, p. 5.
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vre theory arose, with emphasis on mobility and high speed in order to 
outmanoeuvre the opponent.94 One reason was that the Soviet Union 
had developed a manoeuvre concept already. The Russian traditions 
of warfare at the operational level and operational art dated as far back 
as the 1920s.95 Although this fact had been ignored during the ini-
tial stages of the Cold War, by the 1970s the Russians had identified 
an opportunity for a successful and quick penetration of NATO’s de-
fences.96 The insufficient depth of NATO’s defence made the Alliance 
vulnerable to such an incursion. At the same time, USA’s war of attri-
tion in Vietnam was regarded as a failure. New ideas were required. 
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s the USA therefore developed the 
Air Land Battle doctrine, which expanded operational capacities and 
synchronised inter-service cooperation.97
However, NATO and Norway did not adopt this doctrine until 
the Cold War was over.98 In his 1989 comments to a study carried out 
by Major Sverre Diesen, later Chief of Defence, who called for more 
mobility and mobile operations, the then lieutenant colonel Thorstein 
Skiaker, later Commander-In-Chief South Norway, wrote:
This [more mobility and mobile operations] is neither new nor 
unknown in itself, but the main point is that major Diesen also 
demonstrates how to make more conscious use of this matter, and 
how this combination can be used in an operational warfare, there-
by gaining more effect than the sum total of tactical contributions. 
This has so far hardly been discussed among us.99
Skiaker makes two important points. Firstly, in 1970 the institutions 
at the operational level were not conceptually based on operational 
warfare grounded in the manoeuvre method and operational art, a be-
lief apparently shared by many Norwegian officers, but rather that the 
institutions acquired a much more influential role in the development 
of the modern joint operations of today at a later stage. The manoeuvre 
94 Nils M. Rekkedal, Moderne krigskunst, pp. 481–482. Henriksen and Sæveraas, Et mili-
tært universalmiddel?, p. 109ff. Børresen et al., Allianseforsvar i endring, p. 27–29.
95 Bruce Menning, “Operational Art’s Origins”, Military Review, no. 80, September 
(1997): 32–47.
96 Børresen et al., Allianseforsvar i endring, p. 28.
97 Menning, “Operational Art’s Origins”:41–43.
98 Ibid.: 43. Børresen et al., Allianseforsvar i endring, pp. 28–31.
99 Thorstein Skiaker, “Landforsvarets operative idé ved skilleveien?” [The operational 
idea of land defence at a cross roads?], Norsk militært tidsskrift, vol. 158, no. 1 (1989): 
54–55.
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method and operational art now functioned as the touchstone of plan-
ning and conduct of manoeuvre-directed joint operations.100 Secondly, 
there was no clear-cut concept of warfare at the operational level at that 
time (1989). That did not appear until the end of the 1990s, and was 
confirmed by the military forces and their joint operational doctrine 
of 2000.101 
In the 1990s, the character of warfare changed considerably, 
thanks to technological development, increasing speed, precision and 
the potential of firepower.102 The depth of the battlefield and opera-
tional speed at all levels also increased, and war could be waged si-
multaneously in several dimensions.103 It was gradually accepted that 
manoeuvre warfare possessed universal characteristics in the sense 
that most military challenges could be solved by such approach. Not 
least the Gulf War contributed to this acceptance.104 The changes led 
to a strong belief in modern manoeuvre-based warfare, with fewer but 
more mobile and flexible multinational forces.105 The same develop-
ment also contributed to a gradual reduction in force structure, but 
the same warfare concept made greater demands on command and 
control. The 1991 Sunde Committee stressed that “modern warfare 
requirements for command and control have increased the importance 
of headquarters”.106 
In other words, these developments gave defence commands great-
er influence in the planning and conduct of joint operations – not the 
opposite. The need for competence and command and control grew. 
It was therefore considered important to establish headquarters in 
peacetime and to carry out exercises regularly in order to establish and 
maintain the necessary functional competence.107 We may assume that 
this was one of the reasons why Chief of Defence Torolf Rein chose 
to ignore the recommendations of the Sunde Committee and instead 
chose to keep both defence commands in peacetime, even though the 
force structure in other respects was being steadily drawn down.108 The 
100 Norwegian Armed Forces, Forsvarets fellesoperative doktrine, 2007, p. 34; for further 
explanation of the concepts operational methodology and operational art, see Rekkedal, 
Moderne krigskunst, pp. 452–471.
101 Norwegian Armed Forces, Forsvarets fellesoperative doctrine [Norwegian Armed Forces 
Joint Operational Doctrine] (Oslo, 2000), part A and B.
102 Moskos et al., eds, Postmodern Military, p. 5.
103 D. A. Macgregor, “Future battle”: 33–47.
104 Henriksen and Sæveraas, Et militært universalmiddel?, p. 125.
105 Ibid., p. 131ff; Bjerga, Enhet som våpen, p. 206.
106 Headquarters Defence Command Norway, Innstilling fra utvalget til vurdering …, p. 28.
107 Ibid.
108 Frisvold, interview; and Skiaker, interview.
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Proposition to the Parliament no. 16 (1992–1993), Main Guidelines 
for the Activity and Development of the Military Forces in the Years 
1994–1998, states, “reliable command requires the maintenance of an 
adequate peace organisation and war structure, sufficient exercise and 
training activities”.109
Financial resources
Financial resources are the fourth explanation behind the establishment 
and growth of the operational level. Economic rationalisation and im-
proved efficiency informed the establishment of the defence commands 
in 1970. American military assistance had stopped in the 1960s and 
retrenchment measures became more important.110 Improving efficien-
cy and downsizing an expensive and oversized defence leadership were 
now more critical than ever.111 In 1969 the Hauge II Committee stated 
that current arrangements “do not meet the demands for unity and ef-
ficiency. Staff, communications and headquarters are too expensive”.112 
The operational leadership of the three services was diluted. It was also 
important for headquarters to be adjusted to the force structure they 
were to lead in peacetime and wartime, and avoid diverting necessary 
resources from the combat units which would undermine the primary 
missions of the armed forces.113 Substantial cuts in the number of jobs 
as a whole were also necessary; from 250 down to 200 in northern 
Norway and 140 down to 120 in southern Norway.114 Empowering the 
Commander-in-Chief to instruct and direct its administration would 
be one means of preventing suboptimisations within the services, and 
their contribution to defence and budgets planning in this respect 
were essential to create as much defensive power as possible out of the 
defence budget.115 The 1991 Sunde Committee also stressed the reason 
for setting up the integrated commands, to “prevent expensive compe-
tition between services and make the best possible use of resources in 
peacetime and war”.116 
109 Ministry of Defence, Hovedretningslinjer for Forsvarets virksomhet og utvikling i tiden 
1994–1998 [General lines for the activities and development of the Armed Forces 
1994–1998], Report to the Storting, no. 16 (1992–1993), pp. 90 and 219.
110 Tamnes, Oljealder 1965–1995, p. 64.
111 Røksund, ”Forsvaret mellom politisk styring …”, p. 133.
112 Stortinget, Forsvarets regionale ledelse, p. 6.
113 Ibid., p. 5.
114 Ibid., pp. 8–10.
115 Ibid., p. 6; Frisvold, interview.
116 Headquarters Defence Command Norway, Vurdering av Forsvarets øverste ledelse, p. 25.
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In other words, a more coordinated and efficient leadership was 
necessary. The defence commands and their organisation were obvious-
ly regarded as positive factors from an economic perspective, and this 
again paved the way for the organisational changes which took place in 
the late 1960s.117 By 1975 “staff reductions in the organisational and 
leadership structure were considered important”.118
Still, the defence commands were well funded compared to other 
parts of the peace-time organisation. The growing strategic impor-
tance of the northern flank, relations with NATO and a stronger em-
phasis on the use of conventional forces were reflected in favourable 
economical conditions for the operational management. Until 1990, 
the budget surplus was very large indeed, and during the same period 
NATO invested considerable sums in the infrastructure of the head-
quarters.119 The armed forces and their contribution to society were 
strongly supported by public opinion.120 Generous financial provision 
made it possible for the small Norwegian state to establish an op-
erational level similar to that of the great powers. As the Hauge II 
Committee said of itself “[t]he committee is no executioner”, and staff 
levels at headquarters never sank as low as foreseen by the commit-
tee.121 On the contrary, they grew steadily to the end of the 1980s, in 
parallel with the steadily increasing tasks and grants. Although re-
sources were slightly adjusted in the course of the 1990s, it made no 
serious impact on the command structure. The recommendations of 
the Sunde Committee were not followed, as already mentioned. There 
were to be two defence commands in peacetime!122 Defence Command 
South Norway acquired more staff and funding until the turn of the 
century as a result of the establishment of NATO’s headquarters at 
Jåtta in 1994. 
New technology
Explanation number five is technology. The Hauge II Committee 
stated, “the development of modern technology and communications 
not only makes it possible, but also rational and efficient to let the 
joint operational defence commands command and control a larger 
117 Røksund, ”Forsvaret mellom politisk styring …”, p. 152; Tamnes, Oljealder 1965–
1995, p. 64.
118 Stortinget, Erfaringer med den nye organisasjon, p. 3.
119 NOU, Et nytt forsvar. Innstilling fra Forsvarspolitisk utvalg [A new Defence. Report of 
the Defence Committee], no. 20 (Oslo: Norwegian Official Reports, 2000), p. 14.
120 Matlary and Østerud, Mot et avnasjonalisert forsvar?, p. 12.
121 Stortinget, Forsvarets regionale ledelse, p. 6.
122 Kibsgaard, “Norges nasjonale kommandostruktur”, p. 31.
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number of units”.123 This would reduce the number of levels of war 
to less than those found in the command structure of the services, and 
provide a shorter and more secure line of command from the central 
leadership to the tactical forces and detachments. The former organi-
sation had not met the required standards of “coordinated planning 
and leadership, short and direct lines of command or clear operational 
responsibilities”.124 And the Soviet’s demonstration of strength at the 
Norwegian border in the north had revealed a need to make the com-
mand system more efficient across the services.125 
Next, developments in military technology had increased inter-
service dependence. Operations became more advanced and more com-
plicated. The need for a coordinated leadership and integrated joint 
commands increased during the implementation phase of the opera-
tions.126 Thus, technological change reinforced the need to establish 
defence commands. 
Technological development also contributed towards increas-
ing capabilities at the defence commands throughout the 1970s and 
1980s. Maintaining capabilities in specialist areas was a crucial con-
tribution towards providing a competent and efficient system in cri-
sis and in warfare and thus preserving national and allied interests.127 
Technological change also contributed to the previously mentioned 
emphasis on the changing character of warfare and the move towards 
more modern manoeuvre-based warfare.128 
On the other hand, information technology introduced in the 
1990s made information and communications much more efficient, 
and it appeared feasible to reduce the signal support organisation of 
the headquarters. It was not until after the turn of the century, how-
ever, that the real impact of technological developments on the size of 
the headquarters staff came to be felt. 
123 Stortinget, Forsvarets regionale ledelse, p. 5.
124 Ministry of Defence, Forsvarets regionale og lokale organisasjon, p. 2.
125 Ibid., p. 3; Bjerga, Enhet som våpen, pp. 109 and 167.
126 Headquarters Defence Command Norway, Vurdering av Forsvarets øverste ledelse, p. 25.
127 Bjerga, Enhet som våpen, p. 118; Børresen et al., Allianseforsvar i endring, p. 
54.
128 Moskos et al., Postmodern Military, p. 5.
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Chapter 3
The operational level 2000–2008
“We had a sneaking feeling of being left alone up in the north”.
General Sigurd Frisvold
Downsizing and marginalisation
The year 2000 marked a turning point. After the turn of the century, 
the institutions at the operational level suffered five reversals initiating 
a process of disintegration. 
The first setback came in March 2000. In 1997 NATO had estab-
lished a new command structure which was to be fully operational by 
the spring of 2003. The new structure was up and running as early 
as 3 March 2000. The headquarters of the allied forces in Brunssum, 
Netherlands, became the new regional Joint Force Command Northern 
Europe. The allied joint operational command in Jåttå was placed un-
der Brunssum. Jåttå was still supposed to be in command of several 
services in crises and wartime, but from now on it was to operate at 
the third and lowest NATO level, with no clearly defined area of re-
sponsibility. The NATO command was no longer to be an integrated 
part of Defence Command South Norway, only located together. The 
defence commands no longer served as formal NATO headquarters. 
And for the time being, it was decided that the Commander-in-Chief 
South Norway would “wear two hats” as the commander of the two 
headquarters in Jåttå.
In the same period two functional headquarters were established 
under Brunssum. One, in the London suburb of Northwood, would 
command maritime operations (Maritime Component Commander), 
and one, in Ramstein, Germany, air operations (Air Component 
Commander). Under Air Component Commander, five allied air 
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operations centres for tactical control of air operations (Combined 
Air Operations Centre, CAOC) were also established. One of them, 
CAOC 3, was located with Defence Command North Norway in 
Reitan, under the leadership of the Norwegian air commander. 
The marginalisation of NATO’s command structure impacted 
Norway and its institutions at the operational level. Firstly, as a result 
of the new organisation, both defence commands lost influence over, 
and responsibility for the planning and management of operations in 
Norway.129 From now on these activities would mainly be conducted 
from Britain and the Continent. Responsibility for planning and man-
aging NATO’s air operations was moved to Ramstein, except for one 
extended arm reaching out to Reitan, though under allied command. 
Responsibility for sea operations was moved to Northwood. As JHQ 
North had no clearly defined geographical area of responsibility, this 
was a serious setback compared to the former arrangement. Earlier, 
the defence commands were responsible for all types of operations and 
coordinated allied activities at one designated point in international 
waters.130 
Secondly, with NATO’s new and smaller command structure 
multi-functionality was assigned to the strategic and regional levels 
while the development at the tactical level was characterised by the 
individual services, expressed through their single service component 
commands. This was undesirable seen from the Norwegian perspective 
because the Norwegians experience of multi-functional organisation at 
tactical level had been excellent up to 2000.131 To Norwegian eyes, a 
multi-functional organisation at NATO’s tactical level made it easier 
to coordinate services and equipment deployment. Without a multi-
functional tactical level organisation, commanding joint operations in 
a coordinated and general manner would be a challenge. Moreover, 
expenses could be cut with such an approach.132 
Thirdly, it was negative because marginalisation led to the frag-
mentation of the expertise developed at headquarters, especially in 
the north.133 Acquiring and maintaining joint operational capabilities 
were clearly going to be much more difficult. 
129 FFI, En analyse av NATOs nye militære kommandostruktur [An analysis of NATO’s new 
military command structure], report no. 1998/04676 (Kjeller: Norwegian Defence 
Research Establishment, 1998), pp. 19–20; Kibsgaard, “Norges nasjonale komman-
dostruktur”, p. 33.
130 FFI, En analyse av NATOs nye militære kommandostruktur, p. 20.
131 Ibid., p. 51.
132 Ibid., p. 20.
133 Frisvold, interview; and Skiaker, interview.
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The second setback was connected to the reform that started in 2002. 
An extensive downsizing began at headquarters, as a direct conse-
quence of the general reorganisation of the armed forces. One of the 
main difficulties with the reorganisation of the 1990s had been that 
minor changes in leadership and command were not proportionate to 
the considerable reductions in the structure of forces.134 At the turn of 
the century, the command structure was oversized relative to current 
and future structures. New technology had made command and con-
trol easier than before.135 
The Norwegian Special Committee on Defence Policy of 2000 and 
the Defence Study by the Chief of Defence of 2000 both discussed 
these problems in their recommendations. Both recommended a single 
joint operational headquarters. It was obvious that manning two large 
headquarters was difficult in conjunction with the other broad chal-
lenges which faced the armed forces in this new age. For the Special 
Committee on Defence Policy of 2000 “the new headquarters would 
create a powerful national joint operational environment”136. This ar-
gument emphasised the challenges of maintaining joint operational 
competence at two different places in Norway throughout the 1990s 
at a time of rapidly declining funding. While waiting for another re-
port the special committee did not however recommend a new site for 
the joint operational headquarters. Thus Jåttå swept forward as a rival 
to Reitan, which had so far been seen as the best option in regard to 
professional military competence. Later, in the autumn of 2000, Chief 
of Defence Sigurd Frisvold recommended siting the joint operational 
headquarters in Jåttå.137 In their long-term proposition on defence in 
2001 the Government also settled on Jåttå.138 Parliament concurred. 
Defence Command North Norway closed down in December 2002, 
and joint operational headquarters were established in Jåttå under the 
command of Lieutenant General Thorstein Skiaker, placed directly un-
der the Chief of Defence.139 
134 NOU, Et nytt forsvar, p. 15.
135 Stortinget: Omleggingen av Forsvaret i perioden 2002–2005 [Transformation of the Ar-
med Forces in the period 2002–2005], Proposition to the Storting, no. 45 (2000–
2001); Stortinget: Innstilling fra forsvarskomiteen om omleggingen av Forsvaret, p. 16.
136 NOU, Et nytt forsvar, p. 60.
137 NTB,“Ett nasjonalt hovedkvarter” [A national headquarters], press release, 31 Octo-
ber 2000; Frisvold, interview.
138 Ministry of Defence, Omleggingen av Forsvaret i perioden 2002–2005 [Restructuring the 
Armed Forces 2002–2005], Ministry of Defence, Omleggingen av Forsvaret i perioden 
2002–2005, p. 74.
139 Børresen et al., Allianseforsvar i endring, p. 314.
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Many saw this as a negative trend because the capabilities devel-
oped at Defence Command North Norway would be dispersed even 
more. The headquarters were widely regarded as the best equipped 
and staffed and to have the most extensive expertise on joint operations 
acquired during activities and upgrades during the Cold War. Their 
joint operations skills had increased considerably over the years. It had 
become “the centre of excellence in joint operational operations”.140 
Two minor regional commands were established at the same time 
under Joint Operational Headquarters.141 The regional commands 
were regarded as part of the operational level, assigned to assist Joint 
Operational Headquarters avoid an unpractical and oversized area 
of control.142 Regional Command South Norway was established in 
Trondheim and given operational control of territorial defence in the 
region. Regional Command North Norway was established in Reitan 
and given operational control of territorial defence in the three north-
ern counties. In addition, Svalbard, Bjørnøya and Jan Mayen with 
their adjacent oceans were included in its area of responsibility. The 
command focused on joint operations “in line with the long-standing 
joint operational tradition in Reitan”.143 
One result of the reorganisation was a cutback of almost 40 per 
cent in the operational level staff.144 Parallel to the considerable reduc-
tion in allied exercises, the last NATO manoeuvre was in 1999, much 
of the joint operational capability the headquarters had built up, in 
particular in the north, now disintegrated. 
Neither did it become the one and only joint operational head-
quarters, with a powerful national joint operational environment, as 
foreseen by the Defence Study of 2000 and the Special Committee 
on Defence Policy of 2000.145 Instead, three more or less joint opera-
tional headquarters emerged. The situation was unclear, with capabili-
ties and staff spread all over the country. In addition, new missions 
140 Bjerga, Enhet som våpen, p. 205.
141 Stortinget, Innstilling fra forsvarskomiteen om omleggingen av Forsvaret i perioden 2002–
2005 [Recommendation of the Standing Committee on Defence on the transformation 
of the Armed Forces in the period of 2002–2005], Recommendation to the Storting, 
no. 342 (2000–2001); Ministry of Defence, Omleggingen av Forsvaret i perioden 2002–
2005, pp. 16 and 57.
142 Ibid., p. 47.
143 Børresen et al., Allianseforsvar i endring, p. 315.
144 Ministry of Defence, Den videre moderniseringen av Forsvaret i perioden 2005–2008 [The 
continued modernisation of the Armed Forces in the period 2005–2008], Proposition 
to the Storting, no. 42 (2003–2004), pp. 54–55 and pp. 93–94.
145 Headquarters Defence Command Norway, Forsvarssjefens Forsvarsstudie 2000 – slutt-
rapport [The Defence Study by the Norwegian Chief of Defence 2000 – final report], 
Archives of the Armed Forces, dated 22 June 2000, p. 14; NOU, Et nytt forsvar, p. 60.
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connected to international operations and more administrative tasks 
gradually came to dominate at the Joint Operational Headquarters. 
One of the latter was the administration of the allied manoeuvre cen-
tres – which could equally well be attended to by the armed forces 
logistics section.146 
In short, the full consequence of the reorganisation was that the capa-
bility to command joint operations in Norway disintegrated. Norway’s 
national capability in this field was increasingly questioned.147 Flag 
commander Håkon Tronstad, who had more than five years in opera-
tional service in the US Commander Striking Fleet Atlantic and US 
Commander Second Fleet, put it like this: 
I will not draw too harsh a conclusion after the exercise Cold 
Response in 2006. However, as commander of Norwegian task 
group I often felt the lack of an HQ with stronger capabilities 
presenting quick and constructive guidelines. We all know that 
the Joint Operational Headquarters is facing setbacks and reduc-
tions. Transformation of military forces in Norway has generally 
meant fewer man-labour years. … Still, I doubt whether we will 
be able to command and support complicated operations with-
out a staff similar to those of our partners. To make a small joint 
operational headquarters carry out efficient command and con-
trol will depend on us adopting technology and routines which 
have so far not been introduced by others. I cannot foresee this 
situation.148
The third setback came in June 2003 when NATO introduced new 
and extensive changes in the command structure. In October 2003, 
JHQ North was replaced by the Joint Warfare Center, under Allied 
Command Transformation, Norfolk, Virginia, USA. The allied head-
quarters in Jåttå went from being an operational headquarters to an 
exercise centre for training allied staffs. Formally, Norway disappeared 
from NATO’s command structure where defence planning and opera-
tional leadership were concerned. 
This meant that the planning and conduct of NATO operations 
in Norway were further removed from Norway. Jåttå was even more 
146 Frisvold, interview; and Skiaker, interview.
147 Ibid.
148 Håkon Tronstad, Bør det norske forsvaret lære av US Navy? [Should the Norwegian 
defence learn from US Navy?], talk at the Oslo Militære Samfunn, 26 March 2006.
 40 Defence and Security Studies 2-2009
reduced as a joint operational institution. 149 The Joint Warfare Center 
has no influence over defence planning nor does it have any operation-
al function in the NATO command structure. Coordination between 
Joint Warfare Center and Joint operational headquarters might prove 
valuable where the transformation of military forces is concerned. 
This responsibility is assigned to Joint Operational Headquarters in 
Norway. However, its position is insignificant when account is taken 
of the tasks and missions of Joint Operational Headquarters in op-
erational leadership and international operations. These are now sep-
arate institutions, consequently with less significance.150 A scientist 
at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment put it somewhat 
ironically after spending a year seconded to the Joint Operational 
Headquarters: “Co-localisation certainly makes one want headquarters 
to cooperate and assist each other, although this has not led to much 
disturbance in our daily staff routines.”151 While Norway’s political 
influence from having allied headquarters on Norwegian soil should 
not be underestimated, Jåttå as a joint operational institution was con-
siderably weakened when the position of the allied headquarters was 
changed. From then on it also became more difficult to acquire joint 
operational capability. 
The fourth setback came in 2005. Contrary to the Chief of Defence’s 
recommendation the Government decided to close down Regional 
Command South Norway in connection with the long-term plan for 
the armed forces.152 It closed on 1 August 2005 and its tasks were 
transferred to Joint Operational Headquarters, but without a ceiling 
on the number of staff. The result was a further reduction of 50 man-
labour years at the operational level.153 The operational level conse-
quently also lost its grip on territorial forces. Since then these forces 
have experienced a kind of operational leadership void, especially in 
the south.154 Tasks linked to international operations are given higher 
149 Frisvold, interview; and Skiaker, interview.
150 Ibid.; Hansen, interview.
151 FFI, Analysestøtte for Forsvarets operasjoner – ett år ved Fellesoperativt hovedkvarter [Analysis 
support for Defence operations – one year at the Joint operational headquarters], re-
port no. 00012 (Kjeller: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, 2005), p. 9.
152 Defence Staff Norway, Forsvarssjefens militærfaglige utredning 2003 [Chief of Defence 
Norway’s Defence Study 2003 (MFU)], Archives of the Armed Forces, dated 8 Decem-
ber 2003, p. 10; Ministry of Defence, Den videre moderniseringen av Forsvaret i perioden 
2005–2008, p. 55.
153 Ibid., p. 94.
154 Frisvold, interview; and Knut Vold, Lieutenant-General and Commander of the Nor-
wegian Home Guard’s District no. 5, conversation with author, 18. May 2007.
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priority and Joint Operational Headquarters lack the skills to follow 
up the home guard districts adequately. 
The fifth and last setback so far happened on 1 August 2006. Joint 
Operational Headquarters now abandoned the well-known organisa-
tional structure with the commanders from each service. The new or-
ganisation was rebuilt as a joint structure with one chief of staff, one 
operational detachment and one operational support detachment. The 
functional J-structure works as the basis of each detachment, in which 
functions J-2/3/5/7 belong to the operational detachment.155 Other J 
functions, J-1/4/6/8/9, are assigned to the operational support detach-
ment. The positions of commander were discontinued and the skills 
relating to each service and operational room were organised under 
the joint operational detachment. The chief of staff and the chief of 
the joint operational detachment remained on two-star level, the com-
manders of the support detachment and the air operational room were 
both placed at a one-star level. The commanders of the operational 
rooms of sea, ground and special operations forces were placed at the 
level of colonel/commander.156 
One could say that the new system offers a more coordinated and 
efficient leadership of joint operations and headquarter activities. 
Still, removing the commander has undoubtedly undermined head-
quarters’ authority.157 No general will be “checking the services”, and 
making demands, authoritatively and competently - certainly not 
during operations. One might well ask whether today’s arrangement 
of Joint Operational Headquarters could provide a reliable leadership 
for contributing countries if they have to make do with subordinate 
allied forces.158 
To sum up, the years 2000-08 were marked by institutional down-
sizing, cutbacks and the disintegration of joint operational capabili-
ties, all of which weakened the armed forces’ ability to conduct large-
scale joint operations. Institutions were marginalised within NATO, 
losing, in theory at least, operational responsibility and authority. 
155 The functional designations are as follows: J-1 personnel, J-2 intelligence and security, 
J-3 operations, J-4 logistics, J-5 plans, J-6 communication, J-7 exercises, J-8 budget 
and J-9 CIMIC. See appendix A.
156 Ministry of Defence, Den videre moderniseringen av Forsvaret i perioden 2005–2008, p. 
56; appendix A.
157 Skiaker, interview.
158 Frisvold, interview; and Skiaker, interview.
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Explaining the decline
The strategic importance of the northern flank
Explanation number one is the reduced strategic-political importance 
of the northern flank. After the Cold War the new framework led to 
several changes in European defence and security policy, also known 
as The Revolution in Strategic Affairs. The Iron Curtain of the Cold War 
had contained a number of internal and ethnic conflicts. The end of 
the Cold War was followed by several limited wars on the European 
continent in the 1990s. The threat of full-scale nuclear war feared by 
so many was now replaced by real, if limited wars in restricted areas. 
Although the relative importance of the Northern fleet grew and the 
Russians maintained their interests in the northern regions, Russian 
forces on the Kola Peninsula were reduced in size and power. Crisis 
management and peace-support operations moved to the fore, as re-
flected in NATO’s updated strategic concept, which was adopted in 
1999.159 This concept was based on the regulations and main prin-
ciples that had been drawn up in 1991. Further emphasis was now 
placed on the Alliance and its ability to contribute to peace and stabil-
ity in the Euro-Atlantic region. Other threats were given more prior-
ity. The Alliance was authorised to act “out of area”, if required. This 
undoubtedly hastened the decline of Western military strategic inter-
est in the northern flank, and in the Norwegian institutions at the 
operational level in consequence. 
Firstly, the force structure was considerably reduced. The changed 
security environment led to a reduction in structure of 30 and 40 
per cent in NATO and Norway respectively through the 1990s.160 
The command structure which in 2000 appeared oversized relative 
to the operational force structure, is now considerably reduced.161 A 
smaller force structure requires a more modest leadership apparatus. 
The recommendation to set up one joint operational headquarters in 
2000 is explained by an understanding that the force structure had 
become significantly reduced, and that the headquarters might now 
159 NATO, The Alliance’s Strategic Concept Approved by the Heads of State and Government 
participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council,Washington, 23–24 April 1999 
[online 7 May 2007].
160 Øystein Singsaas, “Utviklingen av NATOs kommandostruktur i dagens sikkerhet-
spolitiske situasjon og betydningen for Norge” [The development of NATO’s com-
mand structure in today’s security political situation and its impact on Norway] in 
Kommandospørsmålet på nordflanken – utviklingen i to formative perioder, ed. Rolf Tamnes, 
IFS Info, no. 4 (Oslo: Institutt for forsvarsstudier, 2001), p. 25
161 Ministry of Defence, Omleggingen av Forsvaret i perioden 2002–2005, pp. 10–16.
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command and control most units on their own.162 This paved the way 
for large-scale cutbacks. The reasoning behind the closing of Regional 
Command South Norway was also in part a consequence of the smaller 
force structure.163 
Secondly, the reinforcement concept of the northern flank of al-
lied forces was considered less relevant and the earmarked forces 
were discontinued. The joint operational institutions thus lost many 
of their tasks and missions related to the preparation and reception 
of these forces, making it easier to reduce priority and downsize the 
headquarters.164 
Thirdly, allied exercises in Norway and the activities linked to the 
institutions were considerably reduced after 2000. Deterrence seemed 
less important after the Cold War, and the reductions also led to small-
scale manoeuvres. Allied exercises are still carried out in Norway, and 
quite frequently, but concentrate more on crisis management, civil se-
curity and missions likely to occur in international peace-support op-
erations. Consequently, they are no longer linked to operational plans 
and the conduct of large-scale allied joint operations. Thus, capacity to 
plan and conduct such operations was also adversely affected. 
The Chief of Defence, General Sigurd Frisvold, recognised in the 
light of the new strategic framework, that traditional invasion defence 
with large-scale international operations could no longer determine 
the development and dimension of the operational level.165 He stated 
clearly on 31 October 2000, when he presented his final recommenda-
tion on the future command structure and concluded by calling for the 
establishment of one joint operational headquarters in Jåttå: 
A changed focus from invasion defence to reaction and qual-
ity in order to handle the most obvious challenges, i.e. limited 
attack and crisis management, is a crucial factor in determining 
the dimensions and organisation of the command structure in 
the future.166 
162 Headquarters Defence Command Norway, Forsvarssjefens Forsvarsstudie 2000, p. 14; 
NOU, Et nytt forsvar, p. 60
163 Ministry of Defence, Den videre moderniseringen av Forsvaret i perioden 2005–2008, pp. 
54–55, 93.
164 Frisvold, interview.
165 Ibid.
166 Bjerga, Enhet som våpen, p. 201. Quoted from the assessments and recommendations of 
the Norwegian Chief of Defence on a new command structure.
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At the same time, the northern regions, with their vast oceans, un-
defined borders and large strategic resources, are still important in 
terms of Norwegian defence and security policy. Norway’s relations 
with Russia are increasingly close and cooperative, although the situ-
ation in Russia is still unstable and unpredictable.167 It is regarded 
as necessary, therefore, to maintain an operational leadership element 
in the north to control the “back door” and secure Norwegian rights. 
For this reason Regional Command North Norway was established.168 
Still, as we have seen, this led to a military weakening of institutions 
at the operational level in general in consequence of the dilution of 
trained personnel.169 
Norway in NATO 
Another explanation for the institutional cutback concerns develop-
ments in and Norway’s relations with NATO. The strategic changes of 
the 1990s, together with the implementation of a mobile and deploya-
ble Combined Joint Task Force concept, led to an extensive reorganisa-
tion and reduction in NATO’s command structure.170 To the Alliance 
it was important to transform the command structure in order to han-
dle new assignments and duties more flexibly and efficiently elsewhere 
in the world, in parallel with a steadily decreasing force structure.171 
NATO “eased the pressure” on the northern flank. Marginalisation 
in security policy made it again essential for Norway to concentrate 
on maintaining its influence and a closer relationship to NATO.172 
To Norway these have always been as important as maintaining an 
allied headquarters in the country.173 Nor was Norway included in 
the defence and security policy constellation in the European Union. 
We had “a sneaking feeling of being left alone up in the north”.174 
167 Torgeir Hagen, E-tjenesten i en omskiftelig verden [The intelligence service in a shifting 
world], lecture delivered at Oslo Militære Samfunn, 20 November 2006; Bjerga, Enhet 
som våpen, p. 194.
168 Ministry of Defence, Omleggingen av Forsvaret i perioden 2002–2005, p. 47; Jørgen 
Berggrav, “Landsdelskommando Nord-Norge – operativ blindtarm eller indrefilet?” 
[Regional Command North Norway – operational cul-de-sac or entrecote?], Norsk 
Militært tidsskrift, vol. 172, no. 11 (2003).
169 Frisvold, interview; and Skiaker, interview.
170 NATO, NATO Handbook (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 2001).
171 Singsaas, “Utviklingen av NATOs kommandostruktur”, pp. 24–25.
172 Janne H. Matlary, “Internasjonaliseringen av militærmakten – makt eller avmakt?” 
[Internationalisation of the military power – power or powerlessness] in Mot et avna-
sjonalisert forsvar? eds. Øyvind Østerud and Janne H. Matlary, pp. 185–242.
173 Ministry of Defence, “NATOs nye kommandostruktur – fra 65 til 20 hovedkvarter” 
[NATO’s new command structure – from 65 to 20 headquarters], FD Aktuelt, no. 4 
(1999), p. 4.
174 Frisvold, interview.
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Undoubtedly, this hastened the reduction and marginalisation of the 
operational level in Norway. 
The new command arrangements in 2000 primarily resulted in a sec-
ondary and more marginal position in the NATO command struc-
ture, as mentioned above. Norway had less influence in the Alliance 
regarding defence planning in Norway, less operational responsibil-
ity, unpractical solutions for the operational leadership seen from the 
Norwegian perspective, and fewer opportunities to develop joint op-
erational leadership and competence. 
The marginalisation of NATO’s command structure strengthened the 
focus on a coordinated and efficient national operational leadership of 
the military forces. A chief argument in favour of a single joint opera-
tional headquarters in Norway was that changes in NATO’s command 
structure in 2000 had made “an adapted, but powerful and integrated 
national operational leadership of our forces” essential.175 As a result of 
the Alliance’s weakened concentration on the northern areas, Norway 
was now expected to take responsibility for military operations in a 
lower conflict spectrum.176 One joint operational headquarters would 
have more freedom of action and flexibility, and utilise resources bet-
ter, regardless of threats that might arise. 
Further, Norway’s invitations and adaptations to the allied command 
structure, under the reform of 2002, weakened the competence and 
leadership of the operational level. Defence Command South Norway 
was preferred as the one joint operational headquarters in the country, 
instead of the headquarters in the north. Defence Command North 
Norway had so far been regarded as the most competent of the two 
headquarters.177 The reason not to choose North Norway was to be 
found in the Alliance.178 Chief of Defence sought with his recommen-
dation to secure close relations with allied and Norwegian authorities 
and keep allied staff activities in the country. It was feared that NATO 
would close JHQ North if Norway terminated activity in Jåttå, par-
ticularly as NATO was being pressed to reduce its own command 
structure.179 The Norwegian military leadership entered into a posi-
tive dialogue with the NATO leadership, and was given to understand 
that Norway’s command structure dispositions could affect NATO’s 
175 NTB, “Ett nasjonalt hovedkvarter”.
176 Frisvold, interview.
177 Tore Idsøe, “Ny kommandostruktur ”[New command structure], Nordlys, 14 Novem-
ber 2000.
178 Frisvold, interview.
179 Bjerga, Enhet som våpen, pp. 200–201.
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subsequent activities.180 The growing emphasis on international op-
erations, based on Norway’s interest in keeping the Alliance relevant, 
also pointed in the direction of Jåttå.181 The responsibilities, role and 
functions of the one joint operational headquarters for international 
operations could be simplified provided close contact with NATO’s 
command structure in Jåttå was maintained.182 Thus, much of the 
joint operational expertise built up in Reitan was lost. 
This adaptation to NATO’s command structure also helped disperse 
activities to three locations, making Joint Operational Headquarters 
less powerful than originally intended. Once again the reason was to 
be found with the Alliance. According to the Government, Norway’s 
command structure dispositions would help CAOC 3 in Reitan main-
tain standards and “remain on Norwegian soil with a Norwegian com-
mander”. Regional Command South Norway was also established in 
Trondheim with a view to planning and receiving allied reinforcements 
and to enabling advance storage in Trøndelag. 183 The coordinated, ef-
ficient and competent operational leadership which had been foreseen 
never materialised.184 The chief military argument in favour of a joint 
operational headquarters had been, paradoxically, that “challenges in 
NATO’s command structure have made an adapted, strong and coordi-
nated national operational leadership of our forces essential”.185 It was 
also claimed that Regional Command North Norway had exploited its 
position to expand organisationally more than originally intended and 
at the expense of Joint Operational Headquarters.186 
Thirdly, the organisational setup contributed a kind of ad-
ditional command level in the national chain of command. The 
Regional Command was organisationally part of Joint Operational 
Headquarters. It was to function as advanced headquarters from the 
Joint Operational Headquarters, with staff seconded from the rest of 
the command structure, but it was defined as an independent com-
mand level. This organisational structure required high standards of 
cooperation, coordination and information flow between the headquar-
ters and put the command structure under strain. Given today’s com-
180 Frisvold, interview.
181 Matlary, “Internasjonaliseringen av militærmakten”, p. 230
182 Ministry of Defence, Omleggingen av Forsvaret i perioden 2002–2005, pp. 74–75; Fris-
vold, interview.
183 Ministry of Defence, Omleggingen av Forsvaret i perioden 2002–2005, pp. 74–75.
184 Frisvold, interview.
185 NTB, “Ett nasjonalt hovedkvarter”.
186 Frisvold, interview; and Tomas Colin Archer, Lieutenant-General, interview by au-
thor, 17 April 2007.
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plicated conflict pattern and operational concept the distance from the 
central leadership to tactical units must be as short as possible. This is 
in particular the case in sensitive crisis management where information 
flow is critical, as Norway was to experience with the Elektron affair 
in 2005, when two Norwegian fisheries inspectors were abducted by 
a Russian fishing vessel. In this case Joint Operational Headquarters 
were gradually sidelined.187 These procedures, and having to ask for 
staff reinforcements, breach well-known and important principles of 
equality and responsibility in crisis management. The principles in-
dicate the same organisation, routines and procedures in peacetime, 
crisis and wartime, and with clear-cut interface and regulations. One 
command level and two (later one) headquarters less would make the 
operational leadership less fragmented and its challenges less onerous. 
Finally, the altered status of allied headquarters in Jåttå in 2003, i.e. 
from an operational headquarters to an exercise centre, undoubted-
ly reduced Jåttå as an joint operational institution.188 Firstly, Joint 
Warfare Center had no responsibility for defence planning, making 
it more complicated for Norway to influence the planning process in 
NATO. Secondly, the headquarters have no operational function in 
NATO’s command structure. Joint Warfare Center will not exercise 
command in peacetime, crisis and wartime. NATO now operates mo-
bile headquarters placed immediately under the regional commands 
in Brunssum and Naples in Italy for the operational planning and 
command of Alliance operations. To Lieutenant General Thorstein 
Skiaker, the then Commander HQ North and Chief Joint Operational 
Headquarters, these changes showed that Norway’s intentions to lead 
allied operations on Norwegian soil were being abandoned.189 The op-
erational level of war in Norway remained for national purposes only. 
Thirdly, the changes put an end to the close-knit integration between 
the services, which had been valuable to the development of joint 
operational competence. Norwegian Joint Operational Headquarters 
found that it was no longer easy to enjoy the benefit of competent al-
lied personnel.
187 Ministry of Defence, Oppsummering av ordrer fra forsvarssjef til Landsdelskommando Nord-
Norge på VTC 170100B Oktober 2005 [Summary of orders from the Chief of Defence 
to the Defence Command North Norway at VTC 170100B October 2005], classified 
operational memo issued by FD III, SITSEN.
188 Frisvold, interview; and Skiaker, interview.
189  Skiaker, interview.
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The changing character of war
The third explanation for the disintegration was the changing char-
acter of war, and transition to modern manoeuvre-based warfare. 
The extensive political restructuring in the 1990s, the Revolution in 
Strategic Affairs, the decreasing Russian threat and the appearance of 
new threats, made it easier for NATO to make use of new conventional 
capabilities based on new technology. During the Cold War the focus 
had been on quantity rather than quality.190 Warfare was changed by 
the Revolution in Military Affairs. Moreover, war could now be waged 
in new dimensions, among them psychological warfare, information 
operations and high-tech network operations. New and cognitive do-
mains were considered essential to succeed in a steadily advancing con-
flict pattern, which required an overall and integrated approach. 
These changes made the concept of large-scale joint invasion de-
fence operations seem less relevant. Confidence in modern manoeuvre-
based warfare grew. It was now considered possible to make manoeu-
vre-based warfare more effective. The concept moved towards a more 
indirect and manoeuvre-oriented operational pattern; this was con-
firmed in the new Norwegian joint operational doctrine of the armed 
forces published in 2000. Here the command of joint operations was 
at the centre of attention.191 The doctrine was derived from manoeu-
vre theory, and the method was operational. This concept became 
the foundation of the new Norwegian defence concept. At the same 
time the idea of network-based defence appeared, based on techno-
logical developments and inspired by the American concept of Network 
Centric Warfare. This idea later found expression in the Introduksjon 
til Nettverkbasert Forsvar [Introduction to network-based defence] pub-
lished by the Command and Staff College in Oslo.192 
This development strengthened the need for competence, com-
mand and control, which in turn increased the importance of head-
quarters at the operational level.193 On the other hand, the same proc-
ess brought about the institutional reduction and marginalisation of 
the operational level after 2000. Firstly, the reforms downsized the 
force structure. Emphasis was on forms of warfare in which the enemy 
was out-manoeuvred instead of wearing down his material resources 
190 Børresen et al., Allianseforsvar i endring, p. 29.
191 Norwegian Armed Forces, Forsvarets fellesoperative doktrine, 2000, A and B.
192 Inge Tjøstheim, Introduksjon til nettverkbasert forsvar [Introduction to a network-based 
defence], Militærteoretisk skriftserie, no. 1 (Oslo: The Command and Staff College, 
2001).
193 Norwegian Armed Forces, Forsvarets fellesoperative doktrine, 2000, part B.
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and manpower. The new approach was regarded as “the poor man’s 
concept”, and seemed a reasonable solution in reduced circumstances. 
A subordinate military force, at least in the beginning, was expected to 
defeat a superior force by “out-manoeuvring” the enemy in a “indirect 
approach”. The concept was regarded as risky as the individual soldier 
was of greater worth now than during the Cold War.194 The aim was 
to make the adversary abandon his military objectives, not necessar-
ily to defeat him physically.195 The military forces were slimmer, but 
more mobile and flexible and had little need for a weighty command 
structure.196 As mentioned already, this was an important factor in the 
down-scaling of headquarters in 2002.197 
Secondly, manoeuvre doctrine and network-based defence tend to 
blur the lines between levels and to level out the command structure.198 
It is essential that the situation is perceived consistently across the en-
tire organisation in order to speed up the planning and conduct of the 
operations. Information flow is therefore of vital importance between 
the levels.199 Flexibility is emphasised, independence and initiative as 
well, based on the philosophy of mission command.200 “Subordinate 
commander must be able to decide on their own, based on their inter-
pretation of the commander’s intention, rather than pass information 
through the chain of command and wait for a decision to be made.”201 
For this reason decisions are decentralised, power is moved throughout 
the system, and there is less need for large headquarters. One moves 
Power to the Edge – to subordinates commanders – in accordance with 
NATO’s new conceptualised approach to command and control.202 
We may assume that all this has made reductions at the operation-
al level less complicated. Minister of Defence Kristin Krohn Devold, 
in her outline for the Chief of Defence’s military statement 2003, pre-
sented regulations regarding further downsizing and flattening of the 
194 Henriksen and Sæveraas, Et militært universalmiddel?, p. 86.
195 Headquarters Defence Command Norway, Forsvarssjefens grunnsyn for utvikling og bruk 
av norske styrker i fred, krise og krig [The Norwegian Chief of Defence’s approach to the 
development and use of Norwegian forces in peace, crisis and war] (HQ DEFCOM-
NOR, 1995).
196 Børresen et al., Allianseforsvar i endring, p. 29.
197 Headquarters Defence Command Norway, Forsvarssjefens Forsvarsstudie 2000, p. 14; 
2000:20; NOU, Et nytt forsvar, p. 60.
198 Norwegian Armed Forces, Forsvarets fellesoperative doktrine, 2000, part A, pp. 97–98 
and part B, pp. 40–41; Command and Staff College, Tjøstheim, Introduksjon til nett-
verkbasert forsvar, pp. 46–48.
199 Norwegian Armed Forces, Forsvarets fellesoperative doktrine, 2000, part B, p. 155.
200 Norwegian Armed Forces, Forsvarets fellesoperative doktrine, 2000, part A, p. 53.
201 Ibid.; also see Tjøstheim, Introduksjon til nettverkbasert forsvar, pp. 46–48.
202 David S. Alberts and Richard E. Hayes, Understanding Command and Control, CCRP 
Publications (Washington DC: Department of Defence, 2006), p. 49 ff.
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command structure, based on a network-based defence concept and 
new and harsher demands for rapid information exchange between 
the levels.203 The Government explained its decision to out-phase 
Regional Command South Norway from 2005 by pointing to the fact 
that a network-based defence concept would allow the armed forces to 
command joint operations at high speed, with great flexibility and face 
many different situations. “Therefore the shortest possible distance be-
tween strategic, joint operational and tactical command levels and the 
operational units is vital.”204 It is nevertheless doubtful whether this 
fully explains why Regional Command South Norway was phased out. 
Financial resources were probably more important, although expec-
tations generated by the transition to new operational concepts had 
obviously contributed to the downsizing. 
Thirdly, the new concept reinforced the need for an integrated and 
efficient leadership. Today’s operations require even stronger integra-
tion between the services than before. A network-based defence puts 
an end to the traditional division of sea, air and ground defence. The 
concept calls for the ability to connect intelligence, decision-making, 
sensors and platforms from the services more effectively than before.205 
Improving the capability to coordinate efficient command and control 
of joint operations in accordance with new concepts was, according 
to former commander of Joint Operational Headquarters, Lieutenant 
General Tomas Colin Archer, the chief argument behind the reorgani-
sation of 2006, during which the commanders from the services were 
discontinued.206 They had been placed on a higher level than the chief 
of staff, who had the main responsibility; the services were therefore 
too dominant at the headquarters. The organisation was seen as a hin-
drance to efficient planning and leadership of joint operations as well as 
to the daily routines. Colin Archer’s recommendations were as follows: 
Most operations today, incident and crisis management in-
cluded, require a joint contribution from several services. This 
in turn calls for the capability to establish a mutual understand-
ing and to coordinate and synchronise contributions across serv-
ices. This is vital to make efficient use of resources and realise 
203 Ministry of Defence, Rammer for forsvarssjefens militærfaglige utredning [The scope for 
Norway’s Defence Study], 30 October 2002 (Odinarkiv [23 Jan 2007]).
204 Ministry of Defence, Den videre moderniseringen av Forsvaret i perioden 2005–2008, p. 54.
205 Norwegian Ministry of Defence, Rammer for forsvarssjefens … 
206 Archer, interview.
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desirable outcomes during incidents or crisis. To achieve this, 
image building, planning and command of operations will be 
the best method. This again means that the operational struc-
ture is the highest and most important organisational level in 
the Joint Operational Headquarters, as well as a shifting of focus 
from services to mutual focus in the day-to-day management. 
By localising the service functions in one joint operation room 
through daily activities the operational understanding and com-
petence in the headquarters will also increase.207 
Because there had been too much focus on the services Colin Archer 
terminated the commanders to counter the tendency to exaggerate the 
service focus. Putting special operations force structures at the same 
level as the services was also meant to level out functions in one in-
tegrated direction.208 Time will tell whether a more integrated, ef-
ficient and competent joint operational leadership has been obtained. 
However, headquarters have been weakened as an operational author-
ity for the services.209 One may also ask whether the new arrangement 
will inspire sufficient confidence among contributing countries if al-
lied forces are placed under the command structure.210 The command 
structure is still expected to lead allied joint operations, and the an-
nual winter exercises will be important touchstones in this respect.211 
Financial resources
The fourth explanation for the institutional cutbacks was straitened 
financial circumstances. The new picture after the Cold War and a 
shifting of focus from invasion defence to expedition defence required 
Norway, like all other NATO countries, to respond to with various re-
structuring requirements.212 New and more complicated security chal-
lenges demanded new responses from the armed forces. During the 
1990s, military instruments proved inadequate to the new challenges. 
In consequence NATO countries, Norway included, had to reform 
their military forces and focus more on quality, mobility and reaction 
in order to deploy quickly in a regional effort. 
207 Defence Staff Norway, Anbefalinger om videre utvikling av Forsvarets operative komman-
dostruktur (Oslo: Defence Staff Norway, 2005), p. 1–2.
208 Archer, interview.
209 Skiaker, interview.
210 Frisvold, interview; and Skiaker, interview.
211 Norwegian Ministry of Defence, Rammer for forsvarssjefens …
212 Børresen et al., Allianseforsvar i endring, p. 125.
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At the same time spending on the armed forces in Norway sank 
by NOK 3.3 billion in 2002 money during the decade from 1990 
to 2000, (or 8 per cent of the defence budget, or from 3.1 to 2.1 per 
cent of gross domestic product).213 The need to reduce the structure 
and organisation came quickly and powerfully. Although the Sunde 
Committee had concluded as far back as 1991 that “Reductions in 
spending and in the organisation as a whole will result in a scaling 
back at the command level of the armed forces”, the Government did 
not adopt this particular recommendation.214 By 2001 “it [was] ob-
vious that the armed forces [were] in a deep and permanent struc-
tural crisis”.215 Straitened economic circumstances would finally per-
suade the Government to change the operational leadership structure. 
Resources had to be used in a more integrated and efficient manner. 
After 2000, cuts across the board and calls for greater efficiency 
fuelled the downsizing of the operational level. The Defence Study by 
the Chief of Defence of 2000 and the Special Committee on Defence 
Policy of 2000 addressed this problem. The Committee shared the 
view of the Chief of Defence on the desirability of a single joint opera-
tional headquarters and also emphasised the economic considerations. 
The staff and leadership structures would have to meet cost-efficient 
requirements.216 Parliament took note of the recommendations and 
cut spending on operational levels for the budget period 2002-05 by 
about 40 per cent.217 
Economy was probably also the main reason why Regional 
Command South Norway was phased out in 2005. The Minister of 
Defence advocated in his terms of inquiry for the Chief of Defence’s 
2003 military study more cuts and levelling out of the command 
structure, based on cost-efficiency requirements.218 However, the Chief 
of Defence saw the situation differently: 
It is considered necessary to give the armed forces time to 
implement and gain experience with the present command 
structure, which should be maintained unchanged for a two-year 
213 Ibid., p. 309.
214 Headquarters Defence Command Norway, Vurdering av Forsvarets øverste ledelse, pp. 1 
and 29.
215 Ministry of Defence, Omleggingen av Forsvaret i perioden 2002–2005. 
216 NOU, Et nytt forsvar, p. 60.
217 Ministry of Defence, Den videre moderniseringen av Forsvaret i perioden 2005–2008, p. 
55.
218 Norwegian Ministry of Defence, Rammer for forsvarssjefens …
 The rise and decline of the Operational  53
 Level of War in Norway
period. Afterwards a thorough evaluation should be made at the 
end of 2004 to consider further efficiency and rationalisation of 
national strategic leadership, command structure and foreign 
positions.219 
In spite of these objections the Government still chose to phase 
Regional Command South Norway out in 2005. It was “necessary to 
reduce the command structure further in order to transfer resources 
and responsibilities to operational units”, and address recent demands 
for higher cost-efficiency.220
Phasing out Regional Command South Norway came as a surprise 
to the military leadership. The commander of Regional Command 
South Norway, Major General Kjell Narve Ludvigsen, resigned saying 
that the Ministry of Defence’s recommendation, seen in the light of 
the recommendation of the Chief of Defence “came as a surprise. The 
reasons given in the proposition seemed strange and out of kilter with 
realities”.221 In other words, the argument was neither operational, nor 
military; financial constraints seemed to carry the day. According to 
Chief of Defence Sigurd Frisvold and Chief of Defence Staff Svein Ivar 
Hansen, the cause was disagreement within the Government coalition 
over armed forces policy in the spring of 2004.222 The Government had 
to solve their economic worries “overnight”.223 
The financial situation was also a factor in the reorganisation of 
the Joint Operational Headquarters in 2006. In the Proposition to the 
Storting no 1 (2006-2007), Budget term 2007, the Government told 
Parliament,
 
Reorganisation has been carried out by FOL [The operational 
leadership of the armed forces] as part of a total downsizing of the 
leadership apparatus in the armed forces. This is an important 
part in the downsizing of leadership and staff functions and the 
orientation of the FOL organisation towards operational activity. 
It will also contribute to cutting the resources spent on leader-
219 Defence Staff Norway, Forsvarssjefens militærfaglige utredning 2003, p. 10.
220 Ministry of Defence, Den videre moderniseringen av Forsvaret i perioden 2005–2008, pp. 
55–55 and 93.
221 Regional Command South Norway, “Berømmet sine medarbeidere”, Forsvarsnett, 10 
May 2005 [online 26 Feb 2007].
222 Frisvold, interview; and Hansen, interview.
223 Frisvold, interview.
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ship functions down to the figures presented in Proposition to 
the Parliament no. 42 (2003–2004).224 
Spending considerations were thus behind the extensive post-2000 
reorganisation and institutional downsizing of the operational level.
New Technology
The fifth explanation for the institutional cutbacks is technological 
progress. Firstly, it changed the character of warfare and lay behind the 
adoption of modern manoeuvre and network-based operational con-
cepts. As we saw, there was an urgent need to integrate and streamline 
leadership at the operational level. This also contributed to the slim-
ming down of command structure after 2000. 
Secondly, the expense of mounting a high-tech defence capability 
made considerable reductions in force and command structure nec-
essary.225 The price of new, sophisticated weapons systems delivering 
greater power, range, precision and flexibility, guided by new com-
mand, control and communication systems, rose faster than the gen-
eral price index. Technological progress put more pressure on finances 
after the turn of the century. 
Thirdly, because new information and communications technology 
enables leaders to control a wider area staff cuts could be made at the 
operational level. Network-based defence increases the areas of con-
trol under each headquarters.226 As the joint operational doctrine from 
2000 pointed out “the combination of high competence and adapted 
communication and information technology will downsize staff and 
also increase staying power”.227 The recommendations to reduce joint 
operational headquarters to one assumed that headquarters would be 
able to command most tactical units in all services directly, without 
intervening levels because a smaller force structure and “future leader-
ship and decision systems will make possible larger areas of control 
than today”. 228 Minister of Defence Kristin Krohn Devold also pre-
sented regulations in her outline of the Chief of Defence’s military 
224 Ministry of Defence, Budsjetterminen 2007 [Budgetary period 2007] Proposition to the 
Storting no. 1 (2006–2007), pp. 83–84.
225 Matlary and Østerud, Mot et avnasjonalisert forsvar?, p. 18.
226 Tjøstheim, Introduksjon til Nettverkbasert Forsvar, pp. 46–48.
227 Norwegian Armed Forces, Forsvarets fellesoperative doktrine, 2000, part B, p. 40.
228 NOU, Et nytt forsvar, p. 60; Ministry of Defence, Gjennomføringsproposisjonen – utfyllende 
rammer for omleggingen av Forsvaret i perioden 2002–2005 [Proposition of implementa-
tion – supplementing the scope for transformation of the Armed Forces in the period 
2002–2005], Proposition to the Storting no. 55 (2001–2002), pp. 14–15; Headquar-
ters Defence Command Norway, Forsvarssjefens Forsvarsstudie 2000, p. 14.
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statement in 2003 regarding further downsizing and levelling out of 
the command structure, based on new technology.229 This political ar-
gument was used to justify the discontinuation of Regional Command 
South Norway in 2005.230 New information and communications 
technologies thus inspired and made it possible to rationalise and 
streamline the command structure 
The economic gains may not be as much as anticipated. A net-
work-based defence concept has only partly been operationalised. The 
armed forces have so far only discussed and studied network-based de-
fence conceptually, and made only part of the leap from a platform-
based defence.231 The concept should therefore be seen more as a fu-
ture vision than a reality, despite providing the architecture for a new 
command structure. A report from the Norwegian Defence Research 
Establishment (FFI) in 2004, Forventninger til et nettverkbasert forsvar 
[Network-centric defence model stokes expectations] said that “a gen-
eral impression is that expectations are too high as to how information 
and communications technology (ICT) can generate a common under-
standing and decisions in the organisation”.232 The military recommen-
dations of the Chief of Defence in 2003 and Major General Kjell Narve 
Ludvigsen’s opinion of the discontinuation of Regional Command 
South Norway in 2003 underline this statement.233 Therefore, new 
information and communication technology can have inspired a rather 
premature downsizing of the operational level. 
229 Norwegian Ministry of Defence, Rammer for forsvarssjefens …
230 Ministry of Defence, Den videre moderniseringen av Forsvaret i perioden 2005–2008, pp. 
54–55, 93.
231 Sverre Diesen, “Mot et allianseintegrert forsvar” [Towards an alliance-integrated 
defence], in Mot et avnasjonalisert forsvar, eds Janne H. Matlary and Øyvind Østerud 
(Oslo: Abstrakt, 2005), pp. 171–172.
232 FFI, Forventningene til nettverksbasert Forsvar [Network-centric defence model stokes 
expectations], report no. 04004 (Kjeller: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, 
2004).
233 Defence Staff Norway, Anbefalinger om videre utvikling …, p. 10, Regional Command 
South Norway, “Berømmet sine medarbeidere”.
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Chapter 4
Perspectives on professionalism
Far from advocating war, the military leaders generally viewed it as the 
last resort of policy and looked forward to it with gloomy forebodings and 
feverish preparations.
Samuel P. Huntingto
The Soldier and the State
Huntington laid out his classical theories on the military profession 
and civilian-military relations in his book The Soldier and the State. 
Here he explains how the military profession and relations between the 
military and political authorities contribute towards forming a coun-
try’s defence policy and military institutions. 
To understand Huntington’s model one should be familiar with 
his understanding of the military profession. He depicts officers as con-
servative realists trying to maximise their own organisation while being 
fully prepared for all potential threats.234 Maximising means the quan-
titative dimension of the military forces in relation to grants through 
the defence budget, the qualitative dimension of organisation and lead-
ership, the composition of forces and alliances with other countries. 
Added to this are the dynamic conditions related to the use of military 
force: when and how to use force. He sees officers as conservative real-
ists, meaning that they feel a moral duty to defend society in their role 
as obedient servants to the state. Thus, officers will argue for the need 
to strengthen the military system and in favour of generous budg-
ets. By nature they are concerned with power, pessimists, collectivists, 
234 Huntington, Soldier and the State, pp. 59–79.
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nationalists and have a military and instrumental view of their own 
profession. Politically they should be neutral, and military institutions 
should be independent.
According to Huntington the development of military institutions 
rests on two imperatives, one functional and one social. The functional 
imperative is connected to an external perception of society’s security 
and the extent to which this calls for a powerful military defence. The 
social imperative is related to motivating forces, ideologies and domi-
nant institutions in society. In order to obtain national security it is 
important to weigh military demands based on external threat percep-
tions against other demands. Nations which fail here will, he claims, 
ruin their own resources and expose themselves to internal as well as 
external risks. Huntington’s point of departure is that civil-military 
relations are at the heart of the conflict between imperatives. A well-
balanced relationship is decisive to obtain a “successful” security and 
defence policy. By civil-military relations is meant the balance between 
political control on one hand and military professional independence, 
autonomy and flexibility on the other hand. The objective is to de-
velop civil-military relations which maximise military security with 
the lowest possible costs to society in general. One essential point, 
Huntington says, is the military officers’ need to maximise their own 
organisation as much as possible, regardless of threat levels. 
Civilian-military relations are best maintained through objective ci-
vilian control, according to Huntington. It may express itself through 
indirect political control of military affairs and maximise military 
force. Such control encourages the military profession to adopt a neu-
tral political stance and a voluntary subordination in order to ensure 
civilian control of military force. At the same time it allows officers to 
maximise military effectiveness and ensure national security. In this 
way, they will maintain their professionalism and military independ-
ence. The political level defines the political objectives and the frame-
works through which political power is transferred to the military, 
together with the decision as to which operations should be imple-
mented, and how. The stricter the lines between the military and po-
litical spheres are drawn, the more objective its control will be. The 
stronger the external threats, the more important is objective civilian 
control. Officers’ expertise, legitimacy and jurisdiction over the appli-
cation of military force on behalf of society should not be influenced by 
politicians and other civilians. This also applies to the officers’ desire 
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for professional freedom and autonomy.235 However, there should be 
no doubt that military force is subjected to political authorities and 
civilian control. 
Huntington’s antithesis to objective civilian control is subjective 
civilian control, as a result of which military force is minimised.236 
Subjective civilian control means that specific interests from one or 
several groups in civilian society, including political institutions, strive 
for power and influence. It may express itself through direct political 
control of what should be a military affair. According to Huntington, 
it will undermine the military profession and constrain attempts to 
maximise the military organisation and thereby national security. The 
relation between objective and subjective civilian control, however, 
should be seen as a continuum where the point is not a question of 
either/or, but rather more or less of one or the other.
Norway through the prism of Huntington’s theory
Huntington’s perspectives seem relevant to the establishment and de-
velopment of institutions at the operational level in Norway in the 
period 1970–2000. Both functional and social forces seem to have in-
fluenced this development. 
In terms of the functional imperative containment of the threat from 
the East was central to defence planning during the Cold War. Threats 
to Norwegian territories were taken extremely seriously. The demon-
stration of forces in 1968 caused doubt and uncertainty as to the Soviet 
intentions, and the strategic importance of the northern flank grew, 
also where security policy was concerned.237 A robust and powerful 
military force was therefore of the utmost importance in this situation. 
In terms of the social imperative there was considerable interest sup-
port for a robust and powerful military force. With the Second World 
War still a recent memory, the need to protect the state and national 
territories against the threat from the East was broadly accepted. The 
prevailing ideology was to accept that Norwegian men with barely 
one year of national service training should be sent to wage a total 
war to defend the nation state. A powerful national invasion defence, 
based on military service and reinforcements from the Alliance was 
important both to society and in political circles. The armed forces 
enjoyed stable public support as a national institution with “broad 
235 Ibid., pp. 15–16.
236 Ibid., pp. 59–97.
237 Henriksen and Sæveraas, Et militært universalmiddel?, p. 91.
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participation and a high degree of legitimacy in the population”.238 We 
should remember that political circles in Norway in this period were 
subject to growing Soviet pressure, which partly took the form of a 
well-organised, continuous press campaign over many years and partly 
of threats against Norwegian decision-makers in closed circles.239 This 
obvious and permanent threat from the East also led to an acceptance 
in society that the costs related to the armed forces had to be borne, 
and defence budgets increased.240 In other words, the opportunities to 
maximise military power were good.
A maximised and very strong military force does, however, call for 
political control. It was considered easier to control a military pow-
er with an integrated and unified leadership; under this system the 
Chief of Defence was an independent professional military leader.241 
But the ministerial level lacked the capacity for extensive oversight, 
management and control of the armed forces. American military aid 
had ended in the 1960s and the economic situation made it impossible 
to establish a comprehensive leadership apparatus. This explains why 
the development of new joint commands in the command structure 
led to more objective civilian control. Politicians were also grateful for 
the distance to events provided by the additional command level. A 
clear-cut distinction was drawn between war and peace in terms of the 
threat perception, and between political and military areas of respon-
sibility. More objective civilian control should make it harder to blame 
political levels should operations fail, which might very well happen, 
considering the threat from the East. With regard to such operations, 
the politicians could use the armed forces as a “doormat”, denying all 
responsibility “and lean back”.242 
This train of events fits Huntington’s perspective on officers’ desire 
for professional independence, freedom of action and flexibility. New, 
clearly defined command levels gave them vertical professional auton-
omy. In combination with gradually improved finances, the military 
leadership was now able to maximise its own organisation, in reference 
to the potential threat from the east, as well as meet its tasks and com-
mitments in the Alliance. In a quantitative perspective, willingness 
to maximise was apparent in the organisational growth at the new 
238 Matlary and Østerud, Mot et avnasjonalisert forsvar?, p. 12.
239 Olav T Storvik, “Tønne Huitfeldt”, Aftenposten, 27 March 2007.
240 Erling Bø, “Debatten er forutsigbar” [The debate is predictable], interview by Nina 
Græger, Forsvarets Forum, no. 6 (2007): 26–27.
241 Røksund, ”Forsvaret mellom politisk styring …”, pp. 137–140 and 152.
242 Hansen, interview.
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command level and headquarters’ budgets. In a qualitative perspective 
it found expression in an integrated and efficient leadership and devel-
opment of capabilities at headquarters. With regard to the time and 
place for deploying military force, aspirations to maximise the organi-
sation were expressed in the desire of the chief commanders to handle 
problems independently, quickly and efficiently. The chief command-
ers were given extensive authority and independence. 
So, what was to be done when the threat dissipated at the end of 
the Cold War and spending sank dramatically? From point of view of 
the functional imperative, the threat from the East disappeared, making 
threat assessment more complicated. The need for a quantitative, large 
and powerful defence declined. From the point of view of the social 
imperative, there was no desire to finance a large force structure, and 
between 1990 and 2000 defence expenditure in Norway sank by NOK 
3.3 billion in 2002 money – 8 per cent of the defence budget, or from 
3.1 per cent to 2.1 per cent of the gross domestic product. 243 
However, there was no realignment of the balance between politi-
cal control and professional independence, despite the altered strategic 
situation, new approaches to crisis management on the international 
stage and lower spending. The decade was marked by weak politi-
cal guidance and control for several reasons. Until 1987, the Ministry 
of Defence and Headquarters Defence Command were located in the 
same place. They were now located in separate places. The size and ca-
pacity of Headquarters Defence Command and the now greater physi-
cal distance from their political masters allowed Defence Command to 
fight off or retard policy decisions. The organisation plans contained 
in the Government’s proposition were never put into effect, and few 
if any cuts were made in the command structure. The maintenance 
of military professionalism and emphasis on conventional warfare in 
doctrines and training weakened political control during the war in 
the Balkans in the 1990s.244 Moreover, the upper political echelons in 
Norway were fragmented in the 1990s, with little unity and consist-
ency, as a consequence of tensions between the military and political 
leadership. Cooperation was at an ebb, there was physical distance be-
tween the Ministry of Defence and Headquarters Defence Command, 
each cultivating their own particular mentality. During the 1999 
243 Børresen et al., Allianseforsvar i endring, p. 390.
244 Henning A. Frantzen, “Proper War” and “War in Reality”: The Changing Concept of War, 
IFS Info, no. 6 (Oslo: Institute for Defence Studies, 2002), pp. 6–10.
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Kosovo crisis, political control seemed almost invisible.245 Personal 
conflicts in the upper reaches of government led to weak political con-
trol.246 There was no debate on defence issues in this decade, leaving 
the armed forces to run their own show within certain limits.247 There 
was probably not much political mileage in defence or security policy 
in this period either.248 Interest in scrutinising and controlling the 
military forces seemed weak. It was long since the role of the military 
had been at the centre of controversy, and the possibility of a military 
coup was regarded as non-existent in Norway.249 
So the military could benefit from much objective civilian control and 
vertical professional autonomy. Given their need to maximise their 
own organisation, the leadership structure was not subjected to re-
organisation.250 Lieutenant General Svein Ivar Hansen describes the 
1990s as “the lost decade”. In line with Huntington’s view of officers 
as conservative realists, the armed forces still maximised the threat 
from the East, tried to “keep the light shining” and called for higher 
expenditure.251 It may also be argued that the officers were disloyal 
to political guidelines. However, such criticism seems irrelevant in 
the sense that they always will, in Huntington’s view, call for high 
expenditure based on their conservative realism. Moreover, the threat 
from the East was familiar and therefore easy to keep warm. The fact 
that international military service in peace support operations was 
not regarded as an opportunity to acquire valuable know-how, unlike 
exercises and peacetime operations at home, also reveals a strong in-
clination towards conventional warfare among officers, who preferred 
strictly distinct, well-defined and separate military levels of war.252
The interest in maximising the armed forces was expressed at the 
operational level by Chief of Defence Torolf Rein’s rejection of the 
recommendations of the Sunde Committee and by the maintenance of 
two defence commands. It found further expression in the strength-
ening of Jåttå in the 1990s and the strengthening of capabilities at 
the headquarters after the integration with NATO headquarters in 
245 Børresen et al., Allianseforsvar i endring, pp. 221, 291–292 and 382.
246 Hansen, interview.
247 Bø, “Debatten er forutsigbar”:26.
248 Feaver, Armed Servants, Agency …, p. 180 ff.
249 Torunn L. Haaland, book review: Armed Servants, Agency, oversight, and civil-military 
relations, Norsk Militært Tidsskrift, vol. 173, no. 3 (2004): 28–29.
250 Hansen, interview.
251 Ibid.
252 Frantzen, “Proper War”, pp. 5–11; Børresen et al., Allianseforsvar i endring, p. 229.
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1994.253 The unification of international activities in Jåttå in 2000 was 
also instrumental in this respect, further strengthening the headquar-
ters’ position.254 In Reitan things were more complicated in light of 
new challenges, resulting in higher activity levels in South Norway at 
the cost of Defence Command North Norway in the 1990s. 
Disintegration – Huntington revised
Let us start with Huntington’s functional imperative. The external threat 
to Norway diminished after the Cold War. It was no longer one-dimen-
sional, but more complicated and less distinct than before. Security 
was to be built more on participation abroad to counter threats wher-
ever they appeared. The role of military force changed along with the 
conception of the Norwegian armed forces from an anti-invasion force 
to an expeditionary-oriented force capable of countering such threats. 
Expeditionary defence lays more emphasis on small, standing forces 
with high-tech equipment adapted to local conditions, including con-
ditions in places not covered by the Alliance.255 In Norway, the power 
to mobilise is subordinate to high-quality forces, the general defence 
concept has changed and international operations have come into fo-
cus. In other words, the imperative calls for a modest and better quali-
fied defence. 
In terms of the social imperative, developments after the Cold War 
made defence policy more controversial. According to a report com-
piled in connection with the Government Inquiry into the Structure of 
Power in Norway, which was published in 2002, 40 per cent of chief 
executive leaders in society and 15 per cent of senior officers believe 
that Norwegian forces should not take part in NATO operations out-
side the geographical areas of the Alliance. In a nationwide survey in 
the spring of 2002, 56 per cent were found to share the same opinion, 
while a good third agreed that Norwegian forces could be deployed 
outside the primary areas of the Alliance.256 During the Cold War, 
levels of support for the armed forces had been considerably higher.257 
There were indications that the nation-state and its protection now 
meant less to people in light of increasing internationalism. To the 
man in the street military force is today a rather vague tool whose 
253 Frisvold, interview.
254 Skiaker, interview.
255 Matlary and Østerud, Mot et avnasjonalisert forsvar?, p. 11; Moskos et al., eds, Postmo-
dern Military, pp. 14–17.
256 Gulbrandsen, et al., Norske makteliter.
257 Matlary and Østerud, Mot et avnasjonalisert forsvar?, p. 23.
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function is to benefit the state, and not used by the state.258 After 
2000 perceptions of the military and its role in the Western world 
have grown more ambivalent.259 As a consequence budgets have been 
more limited and expenditure declined. The financial situation has 
been tighter and the general failure of the armed forces to reorganise 
themselves in the 1990s did not help. 
Alliances and coalition operations have internationalised warfare, 
where the use of power is legitimated by bodies at a supra-governmen-
tal level.260 The nation-state has been brought into alliances and ac-
cepted duties far beyond national borders. Supra-governmental bodies, 
such as NATO, the EU and UN have become more powerful and more 
important, also where military force is concerned.261 
The role of the media has also changed. Once controlled partly by 
the state, the media in today’s post-modern society are influenced by 
non-governmental, often international organisations motivated by ide-
als and economy.262 The media exert more influence and thus contribute 
to making the military sphere more political and civilian.263 Thanks to 
advances in media technology the days are long gone since war was seen 
as an isolated event between military forces on the battlefield and its 
inevitable consequences on civilian society were accepted.264 Events on 
the battlefield must bear the light of day. 
As a consequence of the changes in security policy and financial 
constraints, a new balance was struck between political control and 
military professional independence. When Norwegian forces became 
involved in controversial incidents during the Kosovo crisis in 1999, 
politicians felt unable to control events.265 Modern crisis management 
required integrated civil-military leadership and power to exercise 
political-strategic control of the military force. Continuous political-
military contact became more important. Vague distinctions between 
war and peace and fewer possibilities to separate politicians and profes-
sionals were other challenges. A joint report prepared by the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence and Headquarters Defence 
Command after the Kosovo crisis concluded that the challenge now 
258 Ibid.; Diesen, “Mot et allianseintegrert forsvar”, pp. 167–169.
259 Moskos et al., eds, Postmodern Military, p. 20.
260 Ibid., p. 4; Matlary and Østerud, Mot et avnasjonalisert forsvar?, p. 18.
261 Matlary, “Internasjonaliseringen av militærmakten”, pp. 219–236.
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lay in securing political control at every step of the operation. At the 
same time, efficient military leadership should neither be prevented 
nor hampered. Internal consultation and decision-making procedures 
came up against considerable challenges.266 The move from clear con-
text to complicated everyday life called for new arrangements. 
The Defence Study by the Chief of Defence of 2000 and the Special 
Committee on Defence Policy of 2000 recommended restructuring 
the entire command organisation, with a view to reducing and inte-
grating management at the strategic level, and establishing a single 
joint operational headquarters at the operational level.267 Apart from 
financial considerations, the Integrated Strategic Leadership was set 
up in 2003 to widen political-strategic control of the armed forces 
and enhance capacity to handle crisis management at all levels.268 The 
Alliance called for more integrated and unified action from Norway.269 
As part of the 2002/03 reorganisation effort, a combined quantitative 
study was made of human resources at the strategic and operational 
levels. Under the new leadership structure, the Ministry of Defence 
was strengthened by 100 officers, though the bureaucracy as a whole 
remained unchanged. Other military leadership levels were radically 
downsized by the politicians. A small Defence Staff replaced the large 
Headquarters Defence Command, and the operational level was re-
duced considerably. All this undoubtedly made it difficult for the of-
ficers to maximise their own organisation. As they saw it, a high ceiling 
is to no avail if you have to bend your knees to get in.270 Instead one 
can say that civilian power was maximised and moved towards subjec-
tive civilian control.271 
At the same time, there are traces of a maximising process. The 
changes in NATO’s command structure in 2000 had made it vital 
266 Ministry of Defence, Kosovo-krisen: Nasjonal rapport [The Kosovo crisis: domestic re-
port] (Oslo: MoD, 2000), p. 2; also see Røksund, ”Forsvaret mellom politisk sty-
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mentation – supplementing the scope for transformation of the Defence in the period 
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268 Ibid., p. 23; Stortinget, Gjennomføringsproposisjonen – utfyllende rammer for omleggingen av 
Forsvaret i perioden 2002–2005 [Proposition of implementation – supplementing the 
scope for transformation of the Defence in the period 2002–2005], Recommendation 
to the Storting, no. 232 (2001–2002); Ministry of Defence, Gjennomføringsproposisjonen, 
p. 13; Ministry of Defence: Bruk av klasebomber i Hjerkinn skytefelt [The use of cluster 
munitions at Hjerkinn weapon range], press release no. 53, 30 October 2002 (Odin-
arkiv [22 Jan 2007]).
269 Ministry of Defence, Omleggingen av Forsvaret i perioden 2002–2005, pp. 45–47.
270 Hansen, interview.
271 Frisvold, interview; and Hansen, interview.
 66 Defence and Security Studies 2-2009
“to have an adapted, but strong and integrated national operational 
leadership of our forces”.272 One appropriately large joint operational 
headquarters would allow significant freedom of action, flexibility and 
utilisation of resources for countering potential threats.273 Creating a 
single Joint Operational Headquarters would, within strict financial 
limits, be seen as an attempt to maximise a unified, joint military 
ability to command operations and carry out everyday activities at the 
headquarters. By removing the commanders balancing the composi-
tion of the staff structure, it would be possible to oppose maximising 
attempts by each individual service and get a unified and efficient lead-
ership of the military force.274 
The military continues its attempts at self-maximising and retains 
a desire for professional freedom and independence. This serves to un-
derline the continuing tensions inherent in balancing political control 
and military professional freedom. However, the opportunities for the 
military to maximise its own organisation in the light of current fi-
nancial and political guidelines have declined steadily since the end of 
the Cold War, particularly after 2000. It no longer benefits from the 
vertical autonomy of the Cold War era.
Is Huntington still relevant? The various attempts to oppose max-
imising tendencies on the part of the military, strategically and op-
erationally, attest to the relevance of parts of his theory. But others 
must be questioned since the Armed Forces today operate under very 
different conditions than those of the 1950s, when Huntington carried 
out his study. It is harder, for instance, to separate the military and the 
civilian spheres than during the Cold War. The Armed Forces work 
more closely with the political leadership, and have little choice, in 
today’s political, financial and social climate, but to accept a signifi-
cant degree of subjective civilian control, even if this is undesirable 
from Huntington’s perspective. The growing political dominance over 
the military we have seen in most Western countries in recent years, 
reflects a renewed acknowledgement of the fact that the use of mili-
tary power is politics, and military operations and campaigns will al-
ways be of political concern.275 Clausewitz’ words that “war is nothing 
but a continuation of political intercourse with an admixture of other 
272 NTB, “Ett nasjonalt hovedkvarter” [One national headquarters], press release, 31 Oc-
tober 2000.
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means”, seem to have acquired new meaning after the end of the Cold 
War.276 A robust, autonomous military professional operational level 
of war may today represent a threat to political leadership and control 
as it, instead of linking the strategic and the tactical levels, can filter 
out politics and separate the levels instead of knitting them together. 
Especially in situations with a high political profile, such as peace sup-
port operations, this might be a challenge. The operational level of 
war might be a precondition for success in a major high-intensity war, 
but as Hew Strachan argues, one should be careful about thinking of 
this level of war as providing a universally applicable approach. In 
Strachan’s opinion, using the war in Iraq 2003 as an example, the con-
sequence might be a disjunction between the kind of war the military 
is prepared for and the war its government actually asks it to engage 
in.277 The result is a generally purposeless use of force unable to fulfil 
its political objectives.
Further, new security challenges - counter-terrorism, counter-
insurgency and nation-building being three examples - presumably 
place higher demands on civilian involvement, in which the armed 
forces play a more subordinated role.278 Contemporary operations in 
complex conflicts often call for broader solutions and inter-agency op-
erations down to the lowest tactical level.279 There seem to be general 
agreement that we need more civil-military integration and coordina-
tion – not less.280 In this respect, a dominant, autonomous, national 
military command level as prescribed by Huntington might be too 
compartmentalised and separate from the planning and conduct of 
operations.
Huntington’s faith in the professional ethos of officers willing to 
act as obedient servants to the state as long as they stay away from 
politics and civic issues also requires reflection. Peter D. Feaver dis-
cussed this very question in his 2003 Armed Servants, Agency, Oversight, 
and Civil-Military Relations, in which he claims that Huntington’s 
ideal obedience has not really existed after the Cold War in the United 
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States. Instead he points to considerable challenges in relation to the 
political leadership of military power. However, Feaver’s view is hard 
to transfer to the small state of Norway. Huntington’s ideal of officers 
as obedient servants to the state is also a subject of discussion. Loyalty 
and obedience among officers have seldom been discussed in Norway 
and call for further investigation. What I can confirm here and now is 
that military power in Norway must relate to a society, conditions and 
expectations that are very different from 50 years ago. 
   69
Conclusion – rise and decline
The institutional history of the operational level between 1970 and 
2000 was marked by the establishment and growth of two power-
ful joint operational defence commands. Throughout the period the 
defence commands enjoyed high priority, which resulted in increased 
operational responsibility, increased manning, the accumulation of 
much joint operational competence and an increased ability to com-
mand and control national and allied joint operations. They were 
considered among the most important pillars in the allied defence of 
Norway, including deployment of allied reinforcements and conduct 
of war on the northern flank. The institutions had an important role 
in the command of large-scale and allied joint operations in a unified, 
efficient and competent manner, and in maintaining necessary levels 
of surveillance and preparedness. Their capabilities were demonstrated 
through steadily increasing and successful allied joint operational ma-
noeuvres. While Defence Command North Norway came through the 
1990s slightly weakened, it was no less important in surveillance, cri-
sis management and maintenance of Norwegian interests in the north-
ern regions. Defence Command South Norway went from strength to 
strength, culminating in the command of NATO’s Kosovo operation 
at the end of the 1990s. 
In the second period, 2000-08, the operational level faced insti-
tutional disintegration and marginalisation. Increasing institutional 
pressures of recent years on the institutions have led to lower priority 
and reductions in staff. Joint operational competence has disintegrated 
and declined since the turn of the century, and the ability to command 
and control large-scale national and allied joint operations now seems 
somewhat weakened. The operational institutions no longer play a part 
in NATO’s command structure and lack operational responsibilities 
and authority. The operational level in Norway is once again exclusive-
ly geared to national objectives, providing an organisational solution 
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which offers leadership challenges in relation to military operations 
and crisis management. From a national point of view, marginalisation 
has reduced one’s ability to influence defence planning in the Alliance, 
resulted in problematic solutions for operational leadership and fewer 
opportunities to build joint operational competence. Although the 
2006 reorganisation, when the commanders were discontinued, may 
improve joint operations command over time, the authority of the 
level was undoubtedly weakened. In other words, the powerful and 
unified operational leadership foreseen in 2000 has not materialised. 
The rise and decline of Norway’s operational force proceeded 
alongside a complicated pattern of strategic, technological, economic 
and social factors. During both periods the same conditions influenced 
developments. 
The strategic importance of the northern flank: In the beginning of the 
first period the northern flank gained increasing strategic importance 
within NATO, and flank defence was strengthened. Force and exer-
cise activity levels increased as a result of the adoption of the invasion 
defence concept. To meet these contemporary challenges, a powerful 
joint headquarters at the operational level was a prerequisite. The stra-
tegic importance of the northern flank grew in the 1970s and 1980s 
when Norway expanded its territorial waters and USA’s new maritime 
strategy was implemented. New duties and assignments followed, un-
derlining the need for an integrated and efficient command system. 
The operational activity in general and extensive exercise-related ac-
tivity in particular led to the accumulation of considerable operational 
expertise during this period. 
In the 1990s, however, Norway saw its strategic importance weak-
en. There was a tailing off of Western military strategic interest in the 
northern flank. The concepts of invasion and reinforcement in Norway 
became irrelevant. Combined with new operational concepts the force 
levels were considerably reduced. The need for a relatively large leader-
ship apparatus had diminished, and the institutions lost many of their 
duties under the former defence concept. These premises were essential 
for the downsizing which took place after the turn of the century when 
it became politically possible and even desirable to scale down head-
quarters. Moreover, diminishing allied exercise activity after 2000, 
with less focus on large-scale joint operations, led to the disintegration 
of the joint operational capability at headquarters, particularly in the 
north. 
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Norway in NATO: With the growing strategic importance of the 
northern flank, relations with the Alliance became vital. The interests 
of Norway and NATO to establish an efficient and competent leader-
ship in Norway, closely integrated with NATO’s command structure, 
coincided. Allied assistance in case of crisis and war, influence on de-
fence planning in NATO, the acquisition of valuable competence and 
securing national control of allied forces in Norway all seemed prob-
able. An integrated command system became a prerequisite for under-
taking leadership of the flank defence, detecting any hostile attacks 
as soon as possible and serving as a basis for the leadership structure 
in peacetime, which could rapidly transfer the operational command 
to NATO in wartime. The centrality of the institutions in the com-
mand system assured them high priority and formed the basis of rapid 
growth in the size and capabilities of the headquarters. 
However, in the course of the 1990s the interests of Norway and 
NATO in an operational leadership in Norway closely integrated in 
the command structure of the Alliance began to diverge. NATO “eased 
the pressure” on the northern flank. During the two latest reorgani-
sations of NATO’s command structure, the Norwegian institutions 
were cut back and marginalised, losing their central position in the 
Allied command system. They found it harder to attend to national 
interests. Marginalisation made it more difficult for the armed forces 
to deploy military resources in an integrated and effective manner. 
Combined with a greater emphasis on international operations, these 
factors informed the decision taken in 2001 to establish a single joint 
operational headquarters in the south at the expense of a concentra-
tion of joint operational know-how in the north. Consideration for the 
Alliance, combined with national strategic interests in the northern 
regions, made Norway’s dispositions with regard to its own command 
structure even more complicated. The tensions between national and 
allied considerations have weakened the operational level with per-
sonnel and know-how dispersed among several locations. The current 
leadership structure also involves challenges connected to the manage-
ment of operations and crises. 
The changing character of war: NATO’s transition from a doctrine 
of massive retaliation to a doctrine of flexible response in 1967 re-
sulted in a new defence concept linking conventional military forces 
to the operational level. It became important to have an independent 
joint operational command system in each part of the country in order 
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to meet Soviet aggression quickly and effectively. Should a full-scale 
confrontation occur, Norway would have to work with allied forces 
and command extensive combined joint operations. As such operations 
would require highly sophisticated cross-service coordination, one 
would clearly need a powerful and credible invasion defence system 
with an integrated command system at the operational level.
Towards the turn of the century warfare gradually became more 
manoeuvre-oriented. A new manoeuvre-based operational concept and 
network-based defence undermined the concept of large-scale inva-
sion operations. It was no longer as necessary to sustain extensive op-
erational leadership capacities for the remaining forces. The concepts 
have brought levels closer together, increased the necessity to flatten 
the command structure and made it even more imperative to ensure 
integrated, efficient and competent leadership at the operational level. 
These features contributed to a robust cutback of the headquarters af-
ter 2000. 
Financial resources: Economy was an important argument when the 
defence commands were established in 1970. Rationalisation and ef-
ficiency were required, and a unified leadership was seen as important 
in order to prevent inflationary competition between the services. Still, 
a gradual improvement in finances during the 1970s and 1980s made 
it possible for the armed forces to maximise their own organisation and 
establish an operational level comparable to that of the major powers. 
After the Cold War expenditure on the armed forces diminished 
and a more comprehensive reform had become necessary by the turn of 
the century. The operational leadership structure was affected, making 
it necessary to use resources in a more integrated and efficient man-
ner. After 2000 rationalisation and calls for efficiency gains were in-
fluential in decisions downsize the operational level. Tight budgetary 
constraints made it impossible to maintain powerful and influential 
institutions. 
New Technology: Technological progress facilitated a more central-
ised, rational and effective leadership and contributed therefore to the 
1970 establishment of an operational level. It also increased inter-
service dependence, which made joint operations more complicated. 
This, in turn, made it important to establish and develop competence 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s, particularly in order to conduct al-
lied joint operations in a trustworthy manner and ensure national con-
trol of the forces. 
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However, technological developments after 2000 have prompted 
command structure rationalisation and made it technically possible 
for a commander to exercise far-reaching control without a large staff. 
Technology was an underlying force in the development of new op-
erational concepts but increased the cost of high-tech military forces, 
indirectly reinforcing institutional developments after the turn of the 
century. At the same time there is evidence that expectations of the 
new technology’s ability to support command and control were too 
high. In response, the armed forces have tended to realise the divi-
dends of technology and downsize staffs in advance. 
What about the social, civil-military relations? During the Cold 
War the armed forces enjoyed strong public support. A powerful in-
vasion defence, built on conscription and reinforcements from the 
Alliance, was regarded as important also by civilians. The armed forc-
es were a national institution and the public were willing to accept 
substantial spending on defence. Maintaining political control over a 
powerful military force required an integrated leadership and a new 
balance to be struck between political intervention and professional 
soldiers’ desire for independence. The new leadership apparatus added 
another degree of objective civilian control. In a favourable financial cli-
mate the chances for the military to establish and maximise a new 
operational level seemed good. 
After 2000 civil-military relations are increasingly characterised 
by subjective civilian control. Security policy, financing and social consid-
erations have altered. The political level and civilian society have in-
truded more into the armed forces, but with less willingness to spend 
money on them. The military have less room for maximising their own 
organisation and services. They can no longer benefit from the Cold 
War era’s vertical autonomy. Institutions at the operational level find 
themselves in straitened circumstances. The military’s interest in self-
maximisation and desires for professional freedom and independence 
remain as witnessed by the ongoing tension between political control 
and professional military independence. 
Main reasons and mutual relations: Although growth and disinte-
gration have been affected by security policy, technology, funding 
and social issues, security and funding policies seem to have played the 
most important part. It is within these variables we have seen changes 
which are clearly linked to the establishment, growth and disintegra-
tion of the organisations under discussion. The increasing strategic 
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importance of the northern flank, relations with the Alliance and the 
financial environment have been the most important driving forces 
behind their establishment and development, towards the turn of the 
century. Likewise, as the strategic importance of the northern flank 
declined, NATO lost interest in a tightly integrated command struc-
ture in Norway. A difficult economic situation resulted in cutbacks 
and marginalisation after the turn of the century. It seems clear that 
a critical security and financial environment was the main reason why 
decisions were made in the late 1960s and 1990s to reorganise the 
armed forces. There is also an obvious linkage between the evolution of 
security policy and military spending. A clearly perceived threat leads 
to increased expenditure on a more powerful military force – as well as 
the other way round. 
It is evident that institutional requirements created the basis 
for the establishment and growth of the operational level of war in 
Norway. Compared to conceptual factors and professional relations, 
primarily connected to the changing character of war, they have clearly 
been the most important driving forces behind the development of 
these joint operational institutions. In 1970 there was no clear-cut 
concept of warfare at the operational level and even though the institu-
tions were given a much more influential role in the development of 
modern joint military operations, their conceptual needs have played a 
less significant role. External conditions have been far more important.
Nevertheless, the changing character of war and technological progress 
during both periods reinforced and simplified the need for a unified 
and competent leadership at the operational level. In contrast to the 
security and financial environment, however, both fields evolved in one 
direction, one accentuated after the Cold War. The command structure 
came under pressure from a new defence concept after the turn of the 
century, improving opportunities for broader control at headquarters. 
So, these factors also contributed to the cutbacks of the institutions. 
There is an obvious connection here, in which technological devel-
opment engendered new and more manoeuvre-based operational con-
cepts. Expensive technology also contributed to budgetary constraints. 
Finally, social change and alterations in civil-military relations paved 
the way for maximising measures and a new, powerful command level 
towards the turn of the century, although they later made it hard-
er to maintain and maximise the organisation. The general societal 
factors are not, however, as directly implicated in the growth and 
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disintegration of the operational level as the previously mentioned fac-
tors. They seem more like peripheral preconditions than direct causes. 
As we have seen, balanced civil-military relations also depend on the 
changing security and financial environment. 
The need for an integrated leadership: Our five central structural fac-
tors have tended to accentuate the need for integrated leadership at the 
operational level in Norway. This need was spurred on the establish-
ment of the operational level in the 1960s, and has remained a devel-
opmental leitmotif for almost 40 years. It was also the reason behind 
the last reorganisation of Joint Operational Headquarters in 2006; this 
need still seems strong.
So, will the decline continue in the years ahead? Will the opera-
tional level be relevant in the future? It seems probable that the under-
lying forces that I have discussed will continue to operate in the future 
and guide the development of institutions at the operational level.281 
Budgets will in the near future remain tight,282 and reorganisation will 
therefore probably continue in the same direction. 
On the other hand, the nation state may become even more central 
than it is today. Some strong trends point in that direction, includ-
ing growing competition over resources, increasing conflict and great 
power rivalry at the global level, continuous challenges facing the UN 
and NATO, and for Norway challenges in the High North.283 Threats 
against Norway and Norwegian interests at home and abroad may in-
crease, generating a need for a mightier military force than we find 
comfortable today. If so, it will inevitably lead to a larger and more 
robust command apparatus. If the importance of the nation-state does 
increase, ensuring full national control over military activity may also 
be deemed increasingly important, also from the small state perspec-
tive. Such control requires a solid and competent operational level. 
Irrespective of broader developments, the need for a joint opera-
tional headquarters will obviously remain. If national or limited al-
lied joint operations are to be carried out, there will be a need for a 
joint operational level in Norway. The question is, will there be a fur-
ther reduction of the operational level or not? On the one hand, given 
Oslo’s recent decision to site the entire operational level in the High 
281 NATO, “NATO Comprehensive Political Guidance. Endorsed by NATO Heads of 
State and Government. 29 November 2006”, 29 November 2006 [online 19 Jan 
2007].
282 Ministry of Defence, Budsjetterminen 2007, p. 39.
283 NOU, Et styrket forsvar [A Strengthened Defence], report from the Defence Special 
Committee to the Ministry of Defence (Norwegian Official Reports, 2007), p. 7.
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North, it is obviously intended as a consolidating move, as in 2000.284 
Unsurprisingly, the chief arguments in favour of concentrating re-
sources and competence in the North are that it will strengthen the 
capability to command larger national joint operations and allied joint 
exercises and provide a solution to today’s dysfunctional organisation 
of crisis management .285 In combination with the increased strate-
gic importance of the High North and a Government that emphasises 
national interests and national control,286 one may yet see a stronger 
operational level and more robust organisation which is prepared to 
safeguard Norway’s interests both at home and abroad. Furthermore, 
from the geopolitical perspective, Norway will have the only joint op-
erational headquarters in NATO north of the Polar Circle – in a region 
whose strategic importance is likely to grow. Given the anticipated 
downsizing NATO’s command structure, this new national headquar-
ters might be of interest for old reasons. Distance and presence still 
matter.
Of course, there could be further reductions. Firstly, the reorgani-
sation may be seen as an opportunity to cut back on staff and costs. As 
mentioned, future budgets look set to stay tight. Secondly, concentra-
tion at one location in the north will undoubtedly be at the expense 
of the remaining national joint operations capabilities in Jåttå – the 
headquarters that for the present possesses the most competence in joint 
operations. 
The new operational leadership will be found in Reitan for a short 
period. Over the longer term, however, it is not unlikely that the 
headquarters will be moved closer to the strategic leadership in Oslo. 
A possible emphasis on physical proximity between the integrated 
strategic level and the operational level will reflect the evolution of 
civil-military relations we have seen recently, with less emphasis on 
objective civilian control of the military forces and more on subjective 
control. 
Other fundamental questions could be asked of the organisational 
level: Will Norway cling to the old institutional solutions and the 
284 Ministry of Defence, Iverksettingsbrev for forsvarssektoren 2009–2012 [Letter of implemen-
tation for the Defence Sector 2009–2012] (Oslo: Ministry of Defence, 2008), p. 37.
285 Headquarters Defence Command Norway, Forsvarssjefens forsvarsstudie 2007 [The De-
fence Study by the Norwegian Chief of Defence] (Oslo: The Armed Forces, 2007), p. 
17; NOU, Et styrket forsvar, p. 57 and Ministry of Defence, Et forsvar til vern om Nor-
ges sikkerhet, interesser og verdier [Defending Norwegian security, interests and values], 
Proposition to the Storting no. 48 (2007–2008), pp. 73–74.
286 Ibid., p. 23.
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separation of the different levels of war, or will the Government cre-
ate a completely new and effective solution for integrated operational 
leadership? If the latter is deemed necessary, a thorough examination 
of the whole command structure, including strategic and tactical lev-
els and their functions would be required. As in the late 1960s, it 
could be accomplished by a credible civil-military committee enjoying 
the necessary authority at both the political and military levels. Only 
then will we again see a new structure that can meet the challenges 
facing a small state like Norway. A solution that could serve at the cut-
ting edge in NATO and for some time to come. We would still need 
operational art, concepts and methods, but that does not mean that we 
need the operational level of war.
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Terms and expressions
The terms and expressions below are taken from the Norwegian Chief 
of Defence’s Strategic Directive for Operations, appendix A, and the 
new Norwegian Armed Forces Joint Operational Doctrine, appendix A.
Command and control: Command and control is one of the basic 
functions and is fundamental to the planning and execution of 
operations. It consists of the organisation, the processes, the pro-
cedures and the systems that ensure that military commanders 
are in a position to command and control their forces.
Commanding authority: The right and duty to command as required 
and in the right and proper manner.
Directive: Military message which determines regulations or orders 
one particular mission to be executed. A plan meant to be imple-
mented on order or when circumstances which have been indi-
cated occur. In general terms, any message starting or regulating 
an action, manner or procedure. 
Full Command: Full command is the military authority and respon-
sibility of a commander to issue orders to subordinates. It covers 
every aspect of military operations and administration and exists 
only within national services. When members of the Alliance as-
sign forces to NATO, nations will delegate only operational com-
mand or operational control. As a consequence of this, no NATO 
commander will exercise full command over assigned forces.
National use of full command entails authority for a commander 
to direct military activities within that commander’s area of au-
thority, including administration and logistics, unless otherwise 
stated. The concept is used in connection with command of an 
organisational unit, for example a brigade, an air squadron or a 
group of warships. Every commander in principle exercises full 
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command over subordinate commanders in the same unit/forma-
tion, including their subordinate personnel, provided that opera-
tional command has not been excepted or delegated.
Joint operations: Operations in which contributions from several 
service branches are integrated and coordinated in order to realise 
the benefits of synergy at strategic, operational or tactical level, 
often within a multinational framework and usually in close co-
operation with civil resources and agencies.
Manoeuvre method: One of three methods in The operational basis 
of the armed forces (manoeuvre, attrition and stabilisation). The 
manoeuvre method describes a set of techniques which affect the 
opponent’s willingness to continue combat: surprise, initiative, in-
direct method, speed, mission-based leadership and analysis of the force 
and weaknesses of the opponent. The ultimate purpose is to cause a 
physical and psychological breakdown with the opponent. 
Manoeuvre philosophy: One of three approaches which together 
form the basic operational philosophy of the armed forces (effect, 
network, manoeuvre). Manoeuvre philosophy is to understand the 
psychological aspect of combat and to view combat as a battle 
between wills marked by uncertainty and chaos. By striving to 
command these factors through training and exercise and mas-
ter them better than the opponent, challenges may be turned to 
one’s own benefit. Manoeuvre philosophy is to take initiative and 
analyse where to implement these measures in order to obtain the 
best possible effect on the opponent –while using a minimum of 
one’s own forces. Manoeuvre philosophy can be applied on all lev-
els and is the belief that the right effort, at the right time, with 
repeated initiative and continuous pressure on the opponent will 
give a small force the opportunity to affect a large force. 
Operation: A military operation is a series of combat activities, move-
ments and other actions which are intended to achieve an over-
all aim. An operation can be carried out both with and without 
armed action. An operation can be carried out to achieve a strate-
gic objective or it can form part of a series of operations. Such a 
series is called a campaign.
Operational concept: Clear and brief statement of how a commander 
has planned his mission. 
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Operational art: Operational art is a military commander’s use of the 
means at his disposal to achieve the desired effects and achieve 
the overall objectives. The operational art is referred to as an “art” 
because it entails linking together and realising, often abstract, 
strategic aims, by means of physical activities. The term “art” is 
used because it is about managing combat in a range of different 
temporal and spatial dimensions in the physical, social, informa-
tion and cognitive domains where there are few quantifiable val-
ues or set answers. Operational art is also the art of the possible, 
that is to say making use of the resources that one actually has in 
order to achieve the best possible result.
Operational command: Operational command is the authority trans-
ferred to a commander to assign missions or duties to subordi-
nates, to deploy detachments, to reorganise detachments and to 
keep or delegate operational control, tactical command and/or 
tactical control to the extent necessary. Operational command 
does not in itself mean administrative or logistic authority. The 
concept can also be used to indicate the forces which are at the 
disposal of a commander. Operational control means that a com-
mander who has been assigned the force, can use the entire force 
or parts of it to solve assigned missions. The concept describes 
the highest authority a NATO commander exerts over forces de-
tached from member countries. It is used on military strategic 
level. As the authority does not include responsibility for ad-
ministration or logistics, such authority rests with the Chief of 
Defence or the person appointed by him. In a national connec-
tion the Chief Joint Operational Headquarters exerts operational 
command over national forces assigned him until command is 
transferred to NATO. As for national forces not transferred to 
NATO operational command is exerted. The Chief of Defence can 
delegate operational command, operational control, tactical com-
mand and tactical control down the organisation. Operational 
command normally does not include command of operations on a 
day-to-day basis, but leadership through directives, frameworks 
and guidelines. National crisis management can be an exception 
here. 
Operational control: Operational control is the authority transferred 
to a commander to conduct assigned forces to implement duties 
or missions indicated which are normally restricted in action, 
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time or room. This means authority to group assigned detach-
ments and to keep or delegate tactical command and/or tacti-
cal control of these detachments. Operational control does not 
in itself mean authority to use components of the assigned forces 
for missions outside the duties assigned to the operational com-
mander. Operational control does not mean logistic or admin-
istrative control. Operational control is the highest level exert-
ing direct leadership of operations. Operational control includes 
a restricted permission to use assigned forces. Every transfer of 
command shall specify which restrictions apply to each assigned 
force. This authority is applied in NATO on operational level, 
i.e. regional command, and nationally by the defence command. 
Operational control can be delegated between commands on op-
erational level. A commander who has operational control can 
delegate tactical control and detach tactical command on permis-
sion. The restrictions issued in delegating operational control to 
the operational level shall follow the force if this level chooses to 
delegate authority. 
Operational lines of command: General line of command decided 
by the operational organisation and established for one particular 
operation or a series of continuous operations. The degree of au-
thority is further specified and graded as operational command, op-
erational control, tactical command or tactical control. The operational 
command concepts do not in themselves mean responsibility for 
administrative conditions and logistics. 
Operational demands: Demands made by the operational com-
mander to the producer of forces as to the detachments which are 
planned under his command. Among them are personnel, train-
ing and logistics support. 
Transfer of authority (transfer of command): A measure by which 
a nation transfers operational command or operational control 
to a NATO Command, or the corresponding transfer from one 
NATO Command to another. Such a process is also employed 
when Norway assigns forces to coalition operations or to the UN. 
Nationally, the concept of Transfer of Command is used. This 
includes the transfer of both command and control.
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Command Structures and 
Command Relationships
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